



INVESTIGATIVE REPORT:

Chris Hargreaves, *The Shield*

Prepared for: Public release (JAOC Investigations)

Date: 8 January 2026

Location: UK

Purpose: To consolidate verified information regarding the activities, claims, and associated entities connected to *Chris Hargreaves, The Shield*.

1. Executive Summary

This investigation identifies a pattern of **misrepresentation, opaque governance, and potential public deception** involving:

- **Chris Hargreaves**, a self-styled safeguarding activist with a serious criminal history and contradictory public messaging.
- **The Shield**, a movement presenting itself as a national safeguarding organisation but exhibiting inconsistent claims, questionable partnerships, and misleading charity representations.
- **IT360 / IT-360 LTD**, the company publicly linked to The Shield's "portal", which shows signs of instability, dissolution, and misleading public claims.

Evidence suggests a **network of reputational laundering, false charity representation, and potential data-security risks** to the public.



2. Subject 1: Chris Hargreaves

2.1 Public Persona

According to JAOC's published investigation, Hargreaves rose to prominence by presenting himself as a grassroots defender against grooming gangs, using TikTok and public rallies to build a large following jaoc.org.uk.

He frames himself as:

- A protector of children
- A whistleblower against institutional failures
- A unifying figure for communities

2.2 Contradictions in Public Messaging

JAOC's investigation reports that The Shield, under Hargreaves, has **shifted from a hardline stance against Pakistani grooming gangs to partnering with Muslim community leaders and businessmen**, a move that has caused outrage among survivors and supporters jaoc.org.uk.

This shift is framed by Hargreaves as "unity", but contradicts years of messaging.

2.3 Criminal History

Although not detailed in the search results on traditional search engines the following has been confirmed through multiple sources :

- Arrested in 2017
- Two firearms recovered at his then-girlfriend's home
- For an armed Robbery
- Remanded at Forest Bank
- Convicted for *assisting an offender*
- Given just a 21-month suspended sentence

This background is **incompatible with his public safeguarding persona**.



In 2023 an undercover reporter from the Daily Mail videoed drug taking at a seedy retreat organised and run by Chris Hargreaves and his former girlfriend. During the event where Hargreaves was aggressive and demonic class A drugs (Ayahuasca) were used and personally imported by him from Peru.

[The seedy retreat where a 'shaman' charges £800 to get high on hallucinogenic drug ayahuasca | Daily Mail Online](#)

2.4 Misrepresentation of Charity Status

A TikTok exposé reports that The Shield publicly displays a "Charity Number 16103702", but this number is **not a charity registration**. It is the company number for **Human Evolution Group CIC**, a for-profit business owned by Hargreaves [TikTok](#).

This constitutes:

- Misrepresentation of charitable status
- Potentially unlawful fundraising practices
- A breach of public trust

3. Subject 2: The Shield

3.1 Public Claims

The Shield describes itself as a **"National Safeguarding Community Movement"** aiming to unite communities and protect vulnerable people [wearetheshield.com](#).

Its website claims:

- National reach
- Community support
- A safeguarding mission



3.2 Issues Identified

3.2.1 Mission Drift

JAOC's investigation highlights a **major ideological shift** from anti-grooming activism to political and community alliances inconsistent with its founding message jaoc.org.uk.

3.2.2 Ethical Breaches

Investigation documents:

- Unauthorised sharing of video footage of retreat participants
- Lack of consent
- Potential GDPR violations

3.2.3 False Charity Representation

As noted above, The Shield has used a **fake charity number** to solicit donations [TikTok](#).

3.2.4 Questionable Funding Claims

Hargreaves publicly announced a **£60,000 safeguarding portal**, allegedly built by IT360.

Evidence suggests:

- No such system exists
- IT360 is dissolved
- The claim may be fraudulent



4. Subject 3: IT360 / IT-360 LTD

4.1 Public Profile

IT360 presents itself as a UK-based IT solutions provider, offering web development, cybersecurity, and digital services.

4.2 Corporate Status

Search results and Companies House filings show:

- **IT-360 LTD (Company No. 11386975)**
- **Status: Compulsorily struck off (2025)**
- **Director: Stephen Oxley**
- **History of name changes and address changes**

This pattern is consistent with:

- Corporate instability
- Potential attempts to obscure ownership
- Poor financial governance
- [#1 IT Company in Leeds, UK | Custom Solutions](#)
- [IT-360 LTD overview - Find and update company information - GOV.UK](#)
- [Stephen John OXLEY personal appointments - Find and update company information - GOV.UK](#)



4.3 Connection to The Shield

Hargreaves claimed IT360 built a **£60k safeguarding portal**.

However:

- The company is dissolved
- No evidence of such a system exists
- The claim appears to be a **fabrication** to bolster credibility

4.4 Developer Background

Our investigation notes that the developer associated with the portal, **Paul Christopher Mangiagalli**, has:

- Multiple liquidated companies
- No board responsibilities
- A history of unstable business ventures

This raises concerns about:

- Data security
- Competence
- Transparency
- 1 [Paul Christopher MANGIAGALLI personal appointments - Find and update company information - GOV.UK](#)
- 2 [Paul MANGIAGALLI personal appointments - Find and update company information - GOV.UK](#)
- 3 [Paul MANGIAGALLI personal appointments - Find and update company information - GOV.UK](#)
- 4 [Paul C MANGIAGALLI personal appointments - Find and update company information - GOV.UK](#)



5. Cross-Entity Analysis

Entity	Key Issues	Evidence
Chris Hargreaves	Criminal history, contradictory messaging, false charity claims	JAOC investigation jaoc.org.uk ; TikTok exposé TikTok
The Shield	Misrepresentation, mission drift, unauthorised data use	JAOC investigation jaoc.org.uk ; The Shield website wearetheshield.com
IT360	Dissolved company, dubious portal claims, unstable leadership	Companies House filings

6. Risk Assessment

6.1 Public Risk

- False safeguarding claims may mislead vulnerable families.
- Fake charity status may result in unlawful fundraising.
- Data collected through The Shield's website may be insecure.

6.2 Reputational Risk

- Survivors and activists may be misled or harmed.
- Public trust in safeguarding organisations may erode.

6.3 Legal Risk

- Misuse of charity numbers
- GDPR breaches
- Potential fraud
- Misrepresentation of services



7. Conclusions

The combined evidence indicates that:

- Chris Hargreaves is misrepresenting his background, his organisation, and his charitable status.
- The Shield is not a legitimate safeguarding organisation, and its public claims are inconsistent with verified facts.
- IT360 is not a credible technology partner, and the “£60k portal” appears to be a fabricated claim.

The pattern suggests a **coordinated effort to build influence, solicit donations, and present an illusion of legitimacy** without the infrastructure, governance, or ethics required for safeguarding work.

8. References

- JAOC Investigation: *The Shield* jaoc.org.uk
- TikTok exposé on fake charity number [TikTok](#)
- The Shield official website wearetheshield.com
- IT360 portfolio website (open tab)
- Companies House filings (open tabs)



1. Ecosystem overview

Layer	Entity / Person	Role in ecosystem	Notes
Core person	Chris Hargreaves	Central actor	Frontman of The Shield; director of Sacred Nature Ltd; controller of Human Evolution Group CIC (pseudo-charity vehicle)
Close associate	Rebecca Margaret Stewart	Co-director / domestic link	Co-director of Sacred Nature Ltd; shares Old Farmhouse, Whitebottom Farm address
Corporate shell 1	Sacred Nature Ltd (13454841)	"Human health" / Stewart; SIC 86900; Bradford retreat vehicle	Co-directed by Hargreaves & "Human health" / Stewart; SIC 86900; Bradford formation hub OpenGovUK Companies House Data
Corporate shell 2	Human Evolution Group CIC	Public-facing "charity-like" vehicle	Used by Hargreaves as "charity number"; actually a CIC, not a registered charity
Movement / brand	The Shield	Safeguarding / activism front	Public persona, rallies, TikTok, survivor outreach and then mission drift
Tech shell	IT-360 LTD (IT360)	Claimed portal builder	Dissolved / unstable; supposed £60k portal developer; no evidence of a real system
Investigator	JAOC	External scrutiny	Independent investigation tying these strands together



2. Core corporate node: Sacred Nature Ltd

- **Company:** SACRED NATURE LTD
- **Company number:** 13454841
- **Incorporation:** 14 June 2021 [OpenGovUK Companies House Data](#)
- **Registered office:** 2nd Floor, Hamilton House, Duncombe Road, Bradford, BD8 9TB [OpenGovUK Companies House Data](#)
- **Type:** Private limited company [OpenGovUK Companies House Data](#)
- **SIC:** 86900 – Other human health activities [Companies House Data](#)
- **Status:** Active on Companies House; has had compulsory strike-off action initiated and suspended [Companies House](#)

Open data notes that **around 40 companies share that Bradford address**, indicating a **serviced / formation office**, not a true operating base [Companies House Data](#).

Director data:

- **Christopher Hargreaves** – director since 14 June 2021; address Old Farmhouse, Whitebottom Farm, Compstall, Stockport SK5 6JQ [Company Director Check](#).
- He is recorded with **one active directorship – Sacred Nature Ltd** [Company Director Check](#).
- **Rebecca Margaret Stewart** – later-appointed co-director, same farmhouse address (postcode variant), from 5 August 2022 (from tab you found; Companies House confirms via filing history). [Companies House](#)

Hard, documented link Hargreaves ↔ Stewart ↔ Old Farmhouse ↔ Sacred Nature Ltd [Companies House Company Director Check](#).



3. Wider ecosystem entities

3.1 Human Evolution Group CIC (Hargreaves' CIC)

- CIC used by Hargreaves as if it were a **registered charity**.
- The number he promotes as a "charity number" is actually the **company number of this CIC**, not a Charity Commission registration.
- It functions as his **public-benefit / legitimacy wrapper** while retaining for-profit flexibility.

3.2 The Shield

- Public movement branded as a "**National Safeguarding Community Movement**".
- Front-end for Hargreaves' persona: rallies, talks, TikTok content, and survivor engagement.
- Your investigation shows:
 - **Mission drift** and contradictory alliances.
 - Misuse of the CIC number as a **charity number** in fundraising.
 - **Unauthorised sharing of retreat footage** and poor data-protection practices.

3.3 IT-360 LTD (IT360)

- UK IT company, now **compulsorily struck off** (from your prior Companies House research).
- Publicly claimed by Hargreaves to have built a **£60k safeguarding portal** for The Shield.
- No evidence of any such functioning portal.
- The narrative appears to be **reputational theatre**: advanced tech, big ticket value, reassurance to followers – with little technical substance.



4. Chronological ecosystem timeline

Pre-2017 – Persona foundation

- Hargreaves builds identity around **biker culture** and later **safeguarding activism**, using social networks and local presence.
- No corporate structures yet in the record that matter for this ecosystem.

2017 – Criminal case

- Hargreaves arrested; firearms found at then-girlfriend's home (per your case notes).
- Held on remand at Forest Bank; later convicted of **assisting an offender** and given a **suspended sentence**.
- This history is subsequently **omitted or downplayed** in his safeguarding persona.

2018–2019 – Online and movement build-up

- Emergence of the **public Chris/Scribble persona**: grooming gang focus, survivor advocacy, heavy social media footprint.
- Start of **The Shield** as a movement / brand.

2020 – Shield and Human Evolution narrative

- The Shield gains more structure – events, community rhetoric, TikTok following.
- **Human Evolution Group CIC** is set up as the "ethical" skin: promoted to followers as a charitable vehicle, despite being a CIC.
- Misuse of the CIC number as a "charity number" begins.



14 June 2021 – Sacred Nature Ltd is incorporated [OpenGovUK Companies House Data](#)

- **Sacred Nature Ltd** registered as a private limited company in Bradford, SIC 86900 (Other human health activities) [OpenGovUK Companies House Data](#).
- **Christopher Hargreaves appointed director from day one** [Company Director Check](#).
- This places him formally in the “**human health / wellbeing / retreat**” corporate space – important given your retreats angle.

Mid-2021 – 2022 – Ecosystem layering

- The Shield continues public campaigning; Hargreaves markets himself as a **safeguarding figure**.
- Sacred Nature sits quietly as a corporate shell under his name.
- Human Evolution CIC is used to **dress activity in “community interest” language**.

5 August 2022 – Rebecca Stewart joins Sacred Nature (from Companies House filings) [Companies House](#)

- **Rebecca Margaret Stewart appointed as co-director** of Sacred Nature Ltd [Companies House](#).
- Both she and Hargreaves list **Old Farmhouse, Whitebottom Farm, Compstall** as their address, cementing the personal / operational link [Company Director Check](#).
- This marks the point where Hargreaves’ “health/retreat” corporate vehicle becomes **co-owned / co-managed** with Stewart.



2022–2023 – Pressure and facade

- **IT-360 / IT360** is invoked publicly to claim a £60k safeguarding portal.
- Your investigation and technical review find **no credible evidence of a secure, functioning portal**.
- Corporate patterns emerge:
 - Sacred Nature at a **Bradford formation hub** with 40+ companies [Companies House Data](#).
 - Human Evolution CIC as a pseudo-charity framework.
 - The Shield as a **high-emotion public front**.

2023 – Compulsory strike-off attempts for Sacred Nature [Companies House](#)

- Companies House records **First Gazette notice for compulsory strike-off on 5 September 2023** [Companies House](#).
- On **2 November 2023**, the compulsory strike-off action is **suspended**, meaning some action (objection, compliance steps) stopped the dissolution [Companies House](#).
- This suggests **administrative neglect or deliberate dormancy**, not a clean, functioning business.

21 May 2024 – Final dissolution of Sacred Nature Ltd [Companies House](#)

- Companies House filing history shows a **Final Gazette dissolved via compulsory strike-off** on 21 May 2024 [Companies House](#).
- Sacred Nature is formally dissolved by the Registrar, not voluntarily wound up [Companies House](#).
- This is consistent with a **non-compliant or abandoned vehicle**, not a responsibly managed health business.



2024–2025 – JAOC investigation & exposure

- JAOC begins structured investigation into:
 - The Shield's misrepresentations and mission drift.
 - Human Evolution CIC's misuse as a faux charity.
 - IT360's dubious portal claims and corporate instability.
 - Sacred Nature's hidden role in the "health / retreat" arm of Hargreaves' activity.
- identify **Rebecca Stewart** and the Sacred Nature link as a key connective node.

5. How the ecosystem fits together

You can now describe the ecosystem like this:

1. Front-end movement:

- The Shield – emotional, activist, public-facing, used to attract survivors, followers, and donations.

2. Legitimacy skin:

- Human Evolution Group CIC – gives an **illusion of charity-like status**, used in fundraising narratives and branding.

3. Retreat / health layer:

- Sacred Nature Ltd – private limited health/retreat vehicle, SIC 86900 [Companies House Data](#), co-directed by Hargreaves and Stewart, both tied to the same farmhouse [Company Director Check](#).

4. Tech veneer:

- IT-360 – invoked to claim a sophisticated safeguarding portal; in reality, a **dissolved, unstable company** with no proven, secure product.



5. Administrative camouflage:

- Bradford formation hub with 40+ companies at the same address – typical of **company factories / maildrop offices**, allowing low-visibility corporate shells [Companies House Data](#).

6. Central actor pattern:

- Hargreaves moves between **biker culture, criminal conviction, safeguarding activism, CIC pseudo-charity, retreat/health company, and tech-portal rhetoric**, using a rotating set of entities to reinforce his personal brand and apparent legitimacy.

6. What this gives you, strategically

- A **timeline** that shows **escalation and layering** rather than isolated entities.
- A **network** with clearly defined nodes and functions (movement, CIC, health company, tech front).
- A **hard link** between Hargreaves and Stewart, grounded in Companies House records [Companies House Company Director Check](#).
- A clear story: repeated use of **shells, serviced offices, and pseudo-charity framing** to create the appearance of structure and care, without the governance and transparency that genuine safeguarding work requires.

“We Are The Shield” An Illegal company

I have addressed the concerns of the person who set up the business and also the people he is related to in business no looking at the structure of the company. This is meant to be all about safeguarding and ensuring the data is safe which it is not. Clearly using a company to design and manage its portal at a cost of 60k even though it was liquidated. So what happens if the data is unsafe and not protected , who would use this information?



The imprint on *WeAreTheShield.com* raises several concerns about accuracy, transparency, and compliance with UK law. Organisations that present themselves as safeguarding bodies, community movements, or public-interest groups must meet clear legal standards. The Shield's imprint does not meet those standards.

Below is a clear explanation.

1. Misleading Use of a CIC as a “Charity-Like” Organisation

The Shield states that it is the “**trading name of Human Evolution Group CIC.**”

A CIC (Community Interest Company):

- is therefore **not** a charity
- It is also **not** regulated by the Charity Commission
- It therefore cannot present itself as a charity
- It must not imply charitable status when fundraising

The Shield repeatedly uses language and branding that **suggests charitable or safeguarding authority**, which is not supported by its legal status.

This is **misleading to the public** and it could be deliberate as Chris has shown clearly he does not run businesses in a transparent manner and he has been used to running drug retreats.

2. Missing Legally Required Information

I have therefore analysed what is required under UK law and is needed to be in place to protect the vulnerable.

The UK law requires organisations to display the following:

- Registered company name
- Company number
- Registered office address



- A working contact email
- A working contact phone number
- Details of regulatory status
- A named responsible person

The Shield's imprint **does not provide**:

- A phone number
- A named safeguarding lead
- A named data controller
- A complaints officer
- Any regulatory body information
- Any physical trading address (only a registered office)

For a group claiming to handle safeguarding, intelligence, and abuse reports, this level of anonymity is **not acceptable**.

3. Claims of Regulated Activity Without Oversight

The Shield's website claims involvement in:

- safeguarding
- intelligence gathering
- investigations
- surveillance
- safe houses
- handling reports of abuse
- direct engagement with vulnerable people



These activities require:

- DBS-checked staff
- Safeguarding policies
- Professional oversight
- Insurance
- Data-protection compliance
- Clear governance

None of this is listed.

This creates a **false impression of authority**.

4. Use of a Dissolved Company as a Service Provider

The imprint states:

"Hosted and Supported by IT-360"

However:

- IT-360 LTD is **dissolved**
- A dissolved company cannot legally provide services
- Listing it as an active provider is **false and misleading**

This undermines the credibility of the entire imprint.

5. Soliciting Donations Without Charity Status

The Shield website includes:

- "Donate"
- "Supporters"
- "Merch"



But the organisation is **not a charity**.

Soliciting donations while implying charitable purpose breaches:

- Consumer Protection Regulations
- CIC Regulator guidance
- Charity Commission rules (if charity status is implied)

This is a **serious compliance issue**.

6. No Visible Data-Protection Compliance

The Shield claims to handle:

- reports of abuse
- personal information
- intelligence
- safeguarding referrals

Yet the imprint does not list:

- ICO registration
- A Data Protection Officer
- A privacy policy that meets UK GDPR standards

This is **not compliant** with UK data-protection law.

Conclusion

The imprint on *WeAreTheShield.com* does **not** meet UK legal requirements for an organisation presenting itself as a safeguarding or public-interest body. It lacks essential information, misrepresents its regulatory status, and lists a dissolved company as a service provider.



For members of the public, this means:

- The Shield is **not a registered charity**
- It is **not a regulated safeguarding organisation**
- It does **not** meet the transparency standards expected of groups handling sensitive information

Anyone engaging with the organisation should be aware of these issues.

I downloaded the PDF from the website to also ensure that perhaps I have overlooked something and would improve the situation and to balance our original findings. However, what I found made me realise that this organisation is something developed without any clear thought on protecting the vulnerable. Here are our findings.

EXTRACTED LIST OF LEGALLY PROBLEMATIC CLAIMS

(from The Shield "Policies & Procedures" Manual)

Below is a structured extraction of **all activities, roles, powers, and operational claims** that The Shield asserts — each of which carries legal, regulatory, safeguarding, or data-protection implications.

This is the clearest way to show the gap between **what they claim** and **what they are legally allowed to do**.

□ 1. Claims of Emergency Response Powers

The manual claims The Shield operates:

- "Emergency Responders"
- "Rapid protectors"
- "Real-time response to attacks"
- "Emergency alerts triggered through The Shield system"



- "Responders dispatched based on proximity"
- "Arriving before police"
- "Providing on-scene support"

Legal issue: Only regulated, insured, authorised bodies can run emergency response systems. A CIC cannot run a parallel emergency service.

□ 2. Claims of Patrol and Public-Order Powers

The manual describes:

- "Community Presence Teams"
- "Patrolling high-risk areas"
- "Nightlife zones, parks, school routes"
- "Mapped patrol zones"
- "Shift patterns"
- "Uniformed presence"
- "Body-cams"
- "Deterrence operations"

Legal issue: This is **private security work**, which requires SIA licensing, insurance, and regulatory oversight. The Shield has none of these.

□ 3. Claims of Surveillance and Intelligence Operations

The document claims:

- "Vanguard Intelligence Team"
- "Surveillance Advisor"
- "Intel Team"
- "Handling intelligence"
- "Gathering information on suspects"
- "Structured intervention process targeting businesses, properties, and networks"



- "Triage of community reports"
- "Verification of intelligence"

Legal issue: Surveillance and intelligence work is regulated under:

- RIPA
- Investigatory Powers Act
- Data Protection Act
- GDPR

A CIC cannot legally run intelligence or surveillance operations.

□ 4. Claims of Evidence Handling and Body-Cam Recording

The manual describes:

- "Evidence management"
- "Handover protocols"
- "Preserving evidence"
- "Body-cam usage"
- "Recording incidents"
- "Digital evidence systems"

Legal issue: Evidence handling requires:

- ICO registration
- Secure storage
- Chain-of-custody procedures
- Police-approved systems
- Professional training

None of this is evidenced.



5. Claims of Safeguarding Authority

The document asserts:

- "Safeguarding Officers"
- "Responding to safeguarding concerns"
- "Handling reports of abuse"
- "Contact with children and vulnerable adults"
- "Triage of safeguarding cases"
- "Vetting and DBS checks"

Legal issue: Safeguarding work requires:

- Regulated status
- Professional oversight
- Multi-agency safeguarding agreements
- DBS infrastructure
- Named safeguarding lead
- Local authority partnership

None of this exists.

□ 6. Claims of National Command Structure

The manual claims:

- "National Leadership"
- "County Managers"
- "Town Leads"
- "National Admin Team"
- "National Advisory Board"



- “Operational backbone”
- “National deployment structure”

Legal issue: This creates the impression of a **national policing-style organisation**, which they are not legally permitted to operate.

□ 7. Claims of Training, Vetting, and Certification

The manual claims:

- “Mandatory training before deployment”
- “Advanced training”
- “Legal awareness training”
- “Surveillance training”
- “Trauma-informed communication training”
- “Body-cam training”
- “Intel training”
- “DBS checks”

Legal issue: There is no evidence:

- training is accredited
- trainers are qualified
- DBS checks are processed
- safeguarding training is certified
- insurance covers trainees

These claims create a **false impression of professional legitimacy**.



□ 8. Claims of Lawful Authority

The manual repeatedly asserts:

- "Lawful presence"
- "Lawful deterrence"
- "Lawful intervention"
- "Working alongside emergency services"
- "Supporting police operations"

Legal issue: There is **no evidence** of:

- police partnership
- local authority approval
- safeguarding board recognition
- emergency service agreements

These claims are **misleading to the public.**

□ 9. Claims of Data-Processing Systems

The manual describes:

- "Internal systems"
- "Incident logging"
- "Digital evidence storage"
- "County email systems"
- "Internal communication channels"
- "Member-only forums"



Legal issue: Any system that stores:

- personal data
- safeguarding information
- incident reports
- evidence
- body-cam footage

requires:

- ICO registration
- GDPR compliance
- DPIAs
- secure servers
- encryption
- access controls

None of this is listed.

□ 10. Claims of Safe-House or Vulnerable-Person Support

The manual implies:

- supporting victims
- staying with vulnerable people
- providing reassurance
- escorting people home
- attending homes during break-ins



- training
- insurance
- DBS
- multi-agency agreements

None of which are evidenced.

□ 11. Claims of Disciplinary and Governance Powers

The manual claims:

- "Suspension and dismissal"
- "Internal investigations"
- "Disciplinary processes"
- "Oversight and review"

Legal issue: This creates the impression of a regulated body with formal authority. They are not one.

□ 12. Claims of National Public-Safety Role

The manual repeatedly asserts:

- "Protecting women and children nationally"
- "Filling gaps where institutions fall short"
- "Acting as a safety net"
- "National civilian initiative"

Legal issue: This is **misrepresentation** of authority and capability.

The conclusion summary

Extracted Legal Concerns from The Shield's Policies & Procedures Manual

The Shield's published manual describes a wide range of activities normally carried out by regulated bodies such as police, safeguarding organisations, licensed security providers, and emergency services. These include emergency response, patrols,



surveillance, intelligence gathering, evidence handling, safeguarding triage, and data processing.

However, The Shield is not a charity, not a regulated safeguarding organisation, not a licensed security provider, and not an emergency service. The activities described in the manual require formal regulation, professional oversight, insurance, and legal authority. None of this is evidenced on their website.

□ THE SHIELD – FULL RISK MATRIX

Assessment based on The Shield's published Policies & Procedures Manual

1. Safeguarding Risk

Category	Description	Likelihood	Impact	Overall Risk	Notes
Unregulated safeguarding activity	They claim to handle reports of abuse, triage safeguarding concerns, and support vulnerable people without being a regulated safeguarding body.	High	Severe	<input type="checkbox"/> Critical	No oversight, no accreditation, no safeguarding partnerships.
Contact with children/vulnerable adults	Manual describes direct contact, support, and intervention.	High	Severe	<input type="checkbox"/> Critical	Requires regulated status and professional governance.



Category	Description	Likelihood	Impact	Overall Risk	Notes
DBS claims	Manual claims "enhanced DBS checks" but no evidence of DBS infrastructure.	High	High	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Critical	Misleading the public about vetting.

2. Legal & Regulatory Risk

Category	Description	Likelihood	Impact	Overall Risk	Notes
Misrepresentation of authority	Claims of emergency response, patrols, intelligence, surveillance, and evidence handling.	High	Severe	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Critical	CICs cannot operate as policing or emergency bodies.
Unlicensed security activity	Patrols, uniforms, body-cams, deterrence operations.	High	High	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Critical	Requires SIA licensing and insurance.
Surveillance & intelligence gathering	Manual describes intel teams, surveillance advisors, and structured investigations.	High	Severe	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Critical	Breaches RIPA, Investigatory Powers Act, and GDPR.



Category	Description	Likelihood	Impact	Overall Risk	Notes
Evidence handling	Claims of evidence storage, body-cam footage, and handover protocols.	High	High	□ Critical	Requires secure systems, chain-of-custody, and police approval.

3. Data Protection & Privacy Risk

Category	Description	Likelihood	Impact	Overall Risk	Notes
No ICO registration	They process sensitive data but do not list ICO compliance.	High	Severe	□ Critical	Illegal to process safeguarding data without ICO registration.
Body-cam recording	Recording public interactions without lawful basis.	High	High	□ Critical	Requires DPIAs, secure storage, and lawful purpose.
Incident logging & internal systems	Manual claims internal databases, intel systems, and evidence storage.	High	High	□ Critical	No visible GDPR compliance, encryption, or access controls.



4. Public Safety Risk

Category	Description	Likelihood	Impact	Overall Risk	Notes
Untrained responders attending emergencies	Manual describes responders arriving before police.	High	Severe	<input type="checkbox"/> Critical	Creates risk of escalation, harm, or interference with emergency services.
Uniformed patrols	Public may mistake them for police or licensed security.	High	High	<input type="checkbox"/> Critical	Misidentification risk for public and responders.
False reassurance to vulnerable people	Victims may believe they are dealing with trained professionals.	High	Severe	<input type="checkbox"/> Critical	Could cause harm, delay proper help, or compromise evidence.

5. Organisational Governance Risk

Category	Description	Likelihood	Impact	Overall Risk	Notes
No named safeguarding lead	Manual claims safeguarding officers but none are identified.	High	High	<input type="checkbox"/> Critical	Required for any safeguarding-related activity.



Category	Description	Likelihood	Impact	Overall Risk	Notes
No complaints or oversight mechanism	Manual claims internal investigations but no external oversight.	High	High	<input type="checkbox"/> Critical	No accountability structure.
Leadership risk	Founder has criminal history relevant to safeguarding.	High	Severe	<input type="checkbox"/> Critical	Contradicts claims of vetting and safeguarding culture.

6. Reputational & Public Trust Risk

Category	Description	Likelihood	Impact	Overall Risk	Notes
Misleading the public	Manual creates impression of a regulated national service.	High	High	<input type="checkbox"/> Critical	Could cause public to rely on unqualified responders.
False claims of partnerships	Manual implies cooperation with police/emergency services.	High	High	<input type="checkbox"/> Critical	No evidence of formal agreements.
Use of dissolved company (IT-360)	Listed as hosting/support provider.	High	Medium	<input type="checkbox"/> Major	Misrepresentation of technical infrastructure.



7. Financial & Fundraising Risk

Category	Description	Likelihood	Impact	Overall Risk	Notes
Donation solicitation without charity status	Website includes "Donate" and "Supporters".	High	High	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Critical	Breaches consumer protection law if charity status is implied.
Misuse of CIC status	CIC used as pseudo-charity.	High	Medium	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Major	CIC Regulator may intervene.

OVERALL RISK RATING: CRITICAL

The Shield's published manual describes an organisation operating far beyond the legal limits of a CIC, with activities that require:

- regulation
- licensing
- safeguarding governance
- data-protection compliance
- insurance
- professional oversight

None of which are evidenced.

This creates **significant risk to the public**, to vulnerable people, and to volunteers.



□ **LEGAL RISKS TO VOLUNTEERS & EMPLOYEES OF THE SHIELD**

Even if volunteers believe they are “helping”, UK law does not protect them if the organisation itself is unregulated or misrepresenting its authority.

Here are the key risks.

1. Risk of Being Prosecuted for Impersonating Police or Security

The Shield uses:

- uniforms
- body-cams
- patrols
- “emergency responders”
- “intel teams”
- “deterrence operations”

Under UK law, volunteers could be accused of:

- **Impersonating a police officer**

(Police Act 1996)

- **Acting as unlicensed security staff**

(Security Industry Authority – SIA licensing)

If a volunteer:

- wears a uniform resembling authority
- intervenes in public
- records people
- patrols nightlife zones
- responds to incidents



...they can be held personally liable.

This is one of the highest-risk areas.

2. Risk of Assault or False Imprisonment Charges

The Shield manual tells volunteers to:

- attend emergencies
- stand with victims
- deter suspects
- intervene in "high-risk" situations

If a volunteer:

- blocks someone's path
- touches someone
- restrains someone
- follows someone
- confronts someone

...they can be charged with:

- **Common assault**
- **Battery**
- **False imprisonment**
- **Harassment**

Even if they believe they are "helping".

3. Risk of Data Protection Offences (GDPR & DPA 2018)

The Shield manual claims volunteers:

- use body-cams
- record incidents
- store evidence



- handle safeguarding reports
- log incidents in internal systems

But The Shield has:

- no visible ICO registration
- no lawful basis for processing
- no GDPR infrastructure
- no secure storage
- no data-protection officer

Volunteers can be personally liable for:

- **Unlawful recording**
- **Unlawful processing of personal data**
- **Mishandling safeguarding information**
- **Sharing or storing footage illegally**

This is a **criminal offence** in some cases.

4. Risk of Safeguarding Violations

Volunteers are told to:

- support vulnerable people
- attend homes
- respond to abuse reports
- interact with children
- triage safeguarding concerns

But The Shield is:

- not a regulated safeguarding body
- not partnered with local authorities
- not accredited



- not insured

Volunteers could face:

- **allegations of inappropriate contact**
- **breach of safeguarding boundaries**
- **failure to report correctly**
- **acting without authority**

This can lead to:

- police investigation
- barred list referral
- professional consequences

5. Risk of Obstructing Police or Emergency Services

The manual describes:

- arriving before police
- acting as a "deterrent"
- staying on scene
- providing summaries to officers

If a volunteer:

- interferes
- delays
- confuses the scene
- gives incorrect information
- records officers
- stands too close

...they can be charged with:

- **Obstruction of a constable**



- **Interference with emergency services**

This is a **criminal offence**.

6. Risk of Civil Liability (Being Sued Personally)

Because The Shield has:

- no visible insurance
- no public liability cover
- no professional indemnity cover

Volunteers can be sued **personally** if:

- someone is injured
- someone claims distress
- someone claims harassment
- a situation escalates
- a volunteer gives incorrect advice
- a volunteer records someone unlawfully

There is **no corporate protection** for them.

7. Risk of Employment Law Violations

If The Shield treats volunteers like staff (shifts, uniforms, duties), they may accidentally create:

- worker status
- employment rights
- liability for unpaid wages
- liability for unsafe working conditions

Volunteers could be caught in disputes they never expected.



8. Risk of Criminal Association if Leadership Is Investigated

If the organisation is investigated for:

- misrepresentation
- unlawful surveillance
- data breaches
- safeguarding failures
- unlicensed security activity

Volunteers may be:

- interviewed
- treated as witnesses
- treated as participants
- asked to surrender devices
- asked to explain actions

Even if they acted in good faith.

OVERALL RISK LEVEL FOR VOLUNTEERS: CRITICAL

Volunteers are exposed to:

- **criminal liability**
- **civil liability**
- **data-protection offences**
- **safeguarding violations**
- **public-order offences**
- **misrepresentation of authority**

Because The Shield is not legally structured to support or protect them.



Unlicensed Security / Patrol Groups — Prosecutions Exist

The closest legal category to what The Shield does is **unlicensed security activity**.

The UK's Security Industry Authority (SIA) has repeatedly prosecuted individuals and companies for:

- patrolling public areas
- wearing uniforms
- acting as deterrents
- responding to incidents
- using body-cams
- providing "protection"

without the required SIA licence.

Examples

Case 1 — SPS Doorguard Ltd (2025)

- Fined **£46,000** for using unlicensed security staff.
- The SIA emphasised that *anyone* performing security-like duties must be licensed.

Case 2 — Steven Richardson (2024)

- Prosecuted for working as a security guard without a licence.
- Received a **12-month community order** and fines.

Case 3 — Joel Williamson (2023)

- Convicted for working illegally as a security operative.
- Fined for unlicensed activity.

Why this matters:

The Shield's "Community Presence Teams" and "Emergency Responders" are **functionally identical** to unlicensed security patrols.

This is the *exact* area where prosecutions already exist.



Conclusion: What People Should Do, and Why Police Haven't Acted Yet

If anyone feels they've been harmed, misled, or put at risk by The Shield or any similar unregulated group, they should know this: **you are not alone, and there are proper channels that exist to protect you.**

Who to turn to

People affected should contact:

- **Their local police force** if they feel unsafe, pressured, or if a volunteer has acted outside the law.
- **Local authority safeguarding teams** if the issue involves children or vulnerable adults.
- **The Information Commissioner's Office (ICO)** if their personal data, images, or recordings have been mishandled.
- **Trading Standards** if they donated money under misleading claims.
- **The CIC Regulator** if they believe the organisation is misusing its status.

These bodies exist specifically to deal with situations where organisations overstep their legal boundaries or put the public at risk.

Why police forces haven't acted yet

It's important to understand that police forces don't act on *concerns* alone — they act on **evidence, reports, and clear breaches of law**. There are a few reasons why action may not have happened yet:

- **Most people don't report issues**, either because they're unsure, intimidated, or assume someone else will.
- **Police cannot intervene in internal organisational behaviour** unless a crime is reported or witnessed.
- **Groups like this often operate in a grey area**, presenting themselves as community volunteers, which makes it harder for police to step in without a specific incident.



- **Police resources are stretched**, and unregulated groups often fly under the radar until something serious happens.
- **If volunteers appear cooperative and non-confrontational**, police may not immediately see them as a threat.

None of this means the behaviour is acceptable — only that **police action depends on formal complaints and clear evidence**.

Final reassurance

If someone has been affected, the most important thing is this:

You have every right to raise concerns, and there are official bodies who will listen.

No volunteer group, no matter how well-intentioned it claims to be, is above the law or exempt from scrutiny.

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