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
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

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
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라퍼지스토어











KOD: 28 0515 EST February 2023
PCN: DIA_F_240K5_A

EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS

8

Israel | Pathways to Providing Lethal Aid to Ukraine (U)

TOP SECRET//SI//TK//FCI BHR ISR//NOFORN//EXDIS

Israel has committed to providing nonlethal aid to Ukraine comprised of intelligence, counter-UAS support, and a civil early warning system as it seeks to maintain its freedom of action in Syria by balancing its ties with the U.S. and Russia. PM Netanyahu indicated Israel has considered providing Ukraine additional defensive systems and support at the UN. Jerusalem likely will consider providing lethal aid under increased U.S. pressure or a perceived degradation in its ties to Russia as a result of Moscow's actions in Iran or Syria that undermine Israeli interests. *sources*

Graphic: (TS//SI//TK//FCI BHR ISR//NOFORN//EXDIS)

	MOST PLAUSIBLE	SCENARIOS THAT COULD DRIVE JERUSALEM TO PROVIDE LETHAL AID (U)	LEAST PLAUSIBLE	
JERUSALEM ADOPTS TURKISH MODEL FOR UKRAINE AID	RUSSIA EXPANDS STRATEGIC ASSISTANCE TO IRAN	ISRAEL EXPANDS OUTREACH TO THE U.S. FOR COUNTER-IRAN OPERATIONS	EXPANDED ADVERSARY AIR DEFENSE PRESENCE AND USE IN SYRIA	
SCENARIO	<p>Israel adopts Turkey's model—under U.S. pressure—and sells lethal defense systems or provides them through third-party entities; it openly advocates for a peaceful end to the conflict and offers to host mediation efforts.</p> <p>Ankara has successfully maintained cordial relations with Moscow while facilitating arms transfers to Kyiv. Jerusalem may believe it can similarly balance its ties.</p>	<p>Russia transfers strategic systems, such as Su-35 FLANKERS or SA-21s to Iran, or expands assistance to Iran's missile, nuclear, or space programs, prompting Israel to provide lethal aid.</p> <p>The IDF is concerned Russia will provide advanced systems or technology, such as steel alloys or other materials used in both missile and space programs, in exchange for Iranian weapons.</p>	<p>Russia continues to allow Iranian advanced conventional weapons through Syria, prompting Israel to request expanded U.S. support for Israeli counter-Iran activities in exchange for lethal aid to Ukraine.</p> <p>Israel defense leaders are advocating for increased aid to counter Iran, including proposing bilateral Israeli-U.S. operations; Israel has regularly requested ATU overflights to support strikes in Syria.</p>	<p>Russia incurs casualties from Israeli strikes and begins directly targeting Israeli aircraft with SAMs; Iran transfers advanced SAMs such as the IR-SA-2 or IR-SA-3 to Syria, shifting Israel's calculus on lethal aid.</p> <p>Israel periodically strikes Syrian and Iranian air defenses in Syria; in 2022, Russia fired an SA-21—likely for messaging purposes—after Israeli aircraft left Syrian airspace following a strike.</p>

Graphic: (TS//SI//TK//FCI BHR ISR//NOFORN//EXDIS)

SELECT ISRAEL-ORIGIN WEAPONS THAT COULD BE TRANSFERRED TO UKRAINE (U)

BARAK-8/MX SAM	SPYDER SAM	SPIKE ATGM
<p>In use by Israeli Navy; ground-based system is export-only.</p> <p>Long (70km) and extended range (150km) variants.</p> <p>Used by Azerbaijan, India, and the UAE, with Morocco scheduled to receive the system in mid-2023 and Colombia in 2026.</p>	<p>Israel exports only IRASAMS equipment.</p> <p>Fires Israeli PYTHON and DERBY AAMs, short (20km) and medium-range (50km) variants.</p> <p>Used by Georgia, India, the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, and the UAE. Czechia scheduled to receive the system in 2025.</p>	<p>Israel exports only IRASAMS equipment.</p> <p>Four variants with differing ranges (2km–10km) and non-line-of-sight capability (30km).</p> <p>Exported to 27 countries: Finland, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, and the UK can manufacture but not export the system.</p>

Graphic: (TS//SI//TK//FCI BHR ISR//NOFORN//EXDIS)

(U) Coordinated with DIA (DRI, MARC, MSC, NGIC, USCENCOM)

JOINT STAFF J2 : DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Classified By: Director for Intelligence, J2, PW748
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 50Y1-HUM

9

RFI# 750 | BDA From Recent Strike? K84 TPDE 19Feb23 U-A

SECRET//REL TO USA, UKR, FVEY

Overall Assessment is: Confirmed Severe Damage

Post-Strike 20FEB23 0806Z

Impact Point 2

Bridge

Impact Point 1

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

Pre-Strike 08FEB23 0837Z

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(SECRET//REL TO USA, UKR, FVEY) On 19FEB23 0440Z, USAF engaged 1x Bridge with 2x PSW munitions, located IVO Kreminna. **PHYSICAL DAMAGE ASSESSMENT: CONFIRMED SEVERE DAMAGE** The strike caused severe damage across approximately 15% of the structure. The weaponized aim point is approximately 1m from impact point 1, 118m from impact point 2, and approximately 8km from the FLOT.

SECRET//REL TO USA, UKR, FVEY

USAF-AFACR 0124-23/20230220



13

SECRET//NOFORN

ICOD: 28 0515 EST February 2023
PCN: DIA_F_2407H_A

UK/PRC | Competing UK Visions for Counter-PRC Policy in Indo-Pacific (S//NF)

In early Feb, UK DefMin Wallace tasked the MOD to explore the option to forward-deploy one of the UK's two Royal Navy aircraft carriers to the Indo-Pacific after 2025. However, the main opposition party has differing security priorities. (S//NF)

Wallace's tasking calls for exploring the establishment of a jointly operated and forward-deployed carrier with Japan or the ROK or seeking U.S. permission to base a carrier in Japan with the U.S. Seventh Fleet; the Royal Navy currently has an access agreement at the British Defence Singapore Support Unit (BDSSU).

RULING CONSERVATIVE PARTY: EXPLORING EXPANDED COUNTER-PRC POLICY

- Wallace asserts that a persistent Indo-Pacific presence brings more value than episodic carrier visits
- Perceives an enduring UK naval presence as the long-term solution over sporadic deployments in the AOR

OPPOSITION LABOUR PARTY: SIGNALING PULLBACK ON COUNTER-PRC EFFORTS

- Shadow DefMin Healey laid out Labour's defense policy, which prioritizes European defense at the expense of an increased Indo-Pacific presence
- Agreed the PRC is a "systemic challenge" but argued against relying on deployment as the primary response due to resource constraints

PRC RESPONSE

- The PRC perceives the current UK government as "anti-China," but has limited its criticism as it conducts a charm offensive
- Beijing has reacted most harshly to regional military deals and deployments, including the 2021 HMS Queen Elizabeth CSG deployment and the AUKUS agreement

PRC RESPONSE

- The PRC has not reacted to the Labour policy, but state media historically has written more favorable articles about Labour than Conservative leaders

ASSESSMENT: Wallace's exploratory directive signals the current administration remains committed to the Indo-Pacific tilt; however, defense budget constraints, logistic hurdles, and manpower shortages likely would preclude forward basing options until at least 2025. Beijing likely would view a permanent CSG deployment as a failure of its UK policy while viewing a Labour-led pullback as a success. (S//NF)

(U) Coordinated with DIA (CMG, EERC), USEUCOM, USINDOPACOM

Joint Staff J2 | DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET//NOFORN

Classified By: Director for Intelligence, J2, FW74803
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM

14

Global Highlights (S//NF)

Terrorism | ISIS Senior Leader Killed in Syria (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

On 24 Feb, ISIS senior leader and global administrator Abu Sara al-Iraqi was reportedly killed in Syria. Abu Sara was the last known figure with at least 3 years of executive experience in ISIS and a direct connection to previous senior leaders; since mid-2020, he led ISIS's General Directorate of Provinces and influenced its strategy, personnel assignments, and most sensitive global operations. (TS//SI//OC/NF)

- Abu Sara joined ISIS's predecessor organization in 2005 and had advised senior ISIS leaders since at least 2018, including former caliphs; he provided attack guidance to ISIS's 36 branches and networks (TS//SI//OC/NF)
- Abu Sara directed financial transfers to regional offices for attack operations; in late Aug 2021, he directed the transfer of \$500k to ISIS in Afghanistan (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

J2 ASSESSMENT: Abu Sara's removal very likely will disrupt ISIS's global cohesion, security, and financial transfers for at least the next 3 months. ISIS likely will rely on its archived institutional knowledge and a new leadership cadre who lack extensive relationships with the group's legacy senior leaders. (TS//SI//OC/NF)

(U) Coordinated with DIA (DCT, MARC), JSOC, NSA, USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, USSOCOM
PCN: DIA_F_240R2_A

ABU SARA AL-IRAQI

Potential successors who worked directly with Abu Sara include: spokesman Abu al-Fida and senior Syria-based leader Hudhayfah al-Shami.

PRC | LHA-31 Completes First Operational Activity (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

In late Feb, the PLAN's YUSHEN LHA-31 completed its inaugural naval activity after certifying in Nov 2022. Task Group-31 returned from the first extended area deployment (EAD) of 2023; this was the first EAD to integrate an LHA and the first time an LHA exited the First Island Chain. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)

- The YUSHEN LHA is able to perform a variety of missions to include amphibious assault and HADR operations; it has similar missions and loadout capacity as the YUZHAO LPD, but its larger flight deck and aircraft hanger decks enable it to carry a much larger complement of helicopters (S//REL TO USA, FVEY)
- Task Group-31 sailed as far east as the U.S. territory of Wake Island and conducted multiship AD exercises and emission control drills (S//NF)

J2 ASSESSMENT: The PLA very likely will utilize the increased air support capability and extensive medical facilities of the YUSHEN LHAs in amphibious exercises throughout the 2023 training cycle. Additionally, LHA participation in EADs likely increases opportunities for the PLA to incorporate expeditionary and HADR training with lift support and equipment. (S//NF)

(U) Coordinated with DIA (CMG), USINDOPACOM
PCN: DIA_F_240N5_A

Joint Staff J2 | DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Classified By: Director for Intelligence, J2, FW74803
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM

Graphic: (TS//SI//OC/NF)



Graphic: (S//NF)



Graphic: (S//NF)



1k Troops
55 Light amphibious tanks*
24 Helicopters
3 OOB
3 YUYI LCMA Landing Craft



*With loaded well deck and main deck

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













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(U//FOUO) CIA Operations Center Intelligence Update

TOP SECRET//SI//SI-G//ORCON/NOFORN/FISA

This version of CIA Operations Center Intelligence Update is from 04:42, 2 March 2023

How to print this Update

Russia: Defense Officials Contemplate Responses to Prigozhin's Claim of Not Receiving Munitions (TS//SI-G//OC/REL FVEY)

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL FVEY) Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) officials as of late February considered possible actions to counter Wagner owner Prigozhin's public accusations that the MOD was not supplying munitions to his troops in Ukraine, according to a signals intelligence report. Defense officials noted Prigozhin's allegations could be legitimate and proposed doubling munitions supplied to Wagner forces followed by a public statement.

(12)(G//OO/121475-23)

Russia, Haiti: Wagner Seeks Possible Security Contracts With Port-au-Prince (S//NF/DSEN)

(S//NF/DSEN) Wagner associates as of late February planned to discreetly travel to Haiti to assess the potential for contracts with the Haitian Government to fight against local gangs, according to a law enforcement report.⁽¹⁾(DEA-NH-IR-396-23)

Hungary, US: Budapest Identifies Washington as Adversary (C//NF)

(C//NF) Hungarian Prime Minister Orban on 22 February identified the US as one of his party's top three adversaries during a political strategy session, according to the US Embassy in Budapest. *Comment: Orban's inclusion of the US in his list of top three adversaries constitutes an escalation of the level of anti-American rhetoric in his discourse.* ⁽²⁾(23 BUDAPEST 51)

Iran: Tehran Prepares for Early March SLV Launch (TS//SI//REL FVEY)

(TS//SI//REL FVEY) The IRGC Aerospace Force as of 28 February is was likely preparing to launch a Gha'em-100 space launch vehicle (SLV) equipped with a Nahid-1 satellite probably in early March, according to a signals intelligence report and imagery analysis.⁽³⁾(3//OO/121457-23)⁽⁴⁾(CA0045)

Iran: IAEA Rescinds Tehran's Voting Rights, Director To Visit Tehran for Enrichment Discussions (TS//SI//REL FVEY/FISA)

(TS//SI//REL FVEY/FISA) The IAEA as of late February informed Tehran it lost voting rights at the IAEA for 2023 due to errors in contributions in 2021 and 2022 and required Tehran to pay a sum more than \$1.4 million to restore its voting rights, according to a signals intelligence report. Separately, IAEA Director

TOP SECRET//SI-GAMMA//ORCON/NOFORN/FISA

offered for the capture or destruction of foreign tanks, and videos of tanks being destroyed would be widely distributed to reduce the confidence of Ukraine and the West and reassure Russian troops of their ability to overcome this new weaponry. The General Staff expected the proposed measures to undermine any desires by Ukrainian leadership to launch counterattacks, damage the image of NATO members that lend support due to the destruction or capture of their so-called modern tanks, and discourage the West from rendering additional assistance to Ukraine.

(U) G/00/122542-23

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY)

Russian Armed Forces Tasked With Mine-Clearing Operations in Luhanska for Gazprom Pipeline

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) Russian state energy conglomerate Gazprom officials in early February requested mine-clearing support from Russian Armed Forces for an area in Luhanska Oblast, Ukraine where they would be building a pipeline between different gas distribution networks. The Gazprom officials specified that the pipeline would be constructed between Raihorodka and Trokhizbenka. (COMMENT: Despite this projected location, additional coordinates and engineering reconnaissance reports detailed below indicate the area being cleared of mines is between Krymske and Trokhizbenka.) In response to the request from Gazprom officials, the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Chief of Engineering Forces was expected to have a proposal outlining the actions required to fulfill the request by 10 February. A Russian MoD official on 6 February reported results of engineering reconnaissance around the area of the projected pipeline, which was defined as an area between Trokhizbenka and Krymske. The overall inspection area consisted of 18 hectares, of which 7 hectares had already been cleared of mines as of 6 February, and was noted to contain hard-to-traverse areas because of plots containing dense vegetation. Preliminary reconnaissance revealed that there were mixed mine fields within the inspection area, specifically PMN and TM-62 mines. It was also specified that to properly conduct mine-clearing operations, a BMP-3M vehicle would need to be allocated. Additionally, an element from the 2nd Army Corps 36th Separate Engineering and Construction Battalion would be tasked with mine-clearing a reinforced concrete vehicle bridge over the Severskiy Donetsk River near Trokhizbenka.

(U) G/11/122383-23

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY)

Russia Reports Insufficient Personnel, Equipment Levels of Eastern GTF Subunits

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) The Russian National Defense Command Center in February disseminated a report on the decreased combat capability of military units operating under the Eastern Grouping of Troops (Forces) (GTF) due to an insufficient quantity of specialized personnel, functioning military equipment, weapons and ammunition as of 15 February. The Russian Federal Security Service Department for Military Counterintelligence reported security and munition storage protocol violations at field army warehouses within the 36th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, 29th Combined Arms Army that could possibly lead to incidents. Specifically, over-watch posts at the brigade's combat positions were not fully deployed, security for the field army warehouse was not assigned, fake warehouse positions were not equipped, and munitions storage locations were not camouflaged. Additionally, vehicles were not being inspected for explosives, man-made barriers with ground sensors for the most dangerous areas of the artillery warehouse were not installed, and artillery ammunition was being stored outside of its packaging in an open field.

(U) G/00/122329-23


(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)

UNSG Considering Early March Travel to Ukraine to Meet With Ukrainian President

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Antonio Guterres and UN Office of the Secretary-General Director Miguel Graca on 28 February discussed the possibility of Guterres traveling to Ukraine in early March to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Guterres disclosed that Ukrainian Presidential Office Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak notified him that Zelenskyy wanted to speak with Guterres in person, which seemed to annoy Guterres. Nonetheless, Guterres wanted Graca to explore possible scenarios for a trip to Kyiv. While Guterres clearly was not happy about going to Kyiv, he asserted that if this was what it took to "disentangle the situation," then it was necessary to make the trip. Guterres instructed Graca to keep the possible trip confidential, and did not want the Ukrainians to know that the UN was exploring the possibilities of a trip there at that time. Shortly thereafter, Graca alerted Assistant Secretary-General for Department of Safety and Security Unaisi Lutu Yuniwaqa about Guterres's possible trip to Ukraine. He

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(U//FOUO) The below information is current as of 1200 ET/1700Z.

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(U) RUSSIA/UKRAINE

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)

UAF in Bakhmut Almost Encircled; HUR Plans to Send in Elite Unit to Stabilize Catastrophic Situation


(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) Ukrainian forces as of 25 February were almost operationally encircled by Russian forces in Bakhmut, Ukraine and Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR) Chairman Kyrylo Budanov on 28 February ordered that an elite HUR combat unit be deployed there for 2 weeks to stabilize what he considered a "catastrophic" situation. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Roman Mashovets on 25 February provided Ukrainian Presidential Office Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak with an update, which assessed that the situation in Bakhmut was rather difficult. According to Mashovets, there was only one UAF supply road to Bakhmut, which was subject to shelling, as well as a couple of foot crossings to the left bank of an unspecified river in Bakhmut. He asserted that the contested area had a "204.8 elevation" and that, if the Russian forces gained full control of it, then they would have almost the entire section west of Bakhmut and a direct line of sight to the UAF supply road. Also, if Russian forces were to take control of an unspecified filtration station, then the supply road would again be under a direct line of fire. Mashovets reported that, for those reasons, the morale in Bakhmut was low, with the Ukrainian forces under the impression that they were almost operationally encircled. Budanov on 28 February explained to UAF Ground Forces Commander Lt. Gen. Oleksandr Syrsky, HUR First Deputy Chief Maj. Gen. Oleh Ivashchenko, and a HUR officer identified only as Vova that HUR would bring in units to Bakhmut for a brief time to stabilize the situation. Budanov later relayed to Vova that the situation in Bakhmut was "catastrophic" and Syrsky declared a need for HUR's Kraken unit to prevent the UAF from losing Bakhmut. Also that day, Syrsky asserted to Budanov that Ukrainian forces desperately needed to reach Yahidne, Ukraine because an unspecified road was the UAF's "last breathing tube." (COMMENT: This is possibly the supply road that Mashovets referenced.) Budanov ordered Vova to send one of "Shaman's" units to Bakhmut for no more than 2 weeks, instructing him to bring in only the unit's combat element and not its command post. (COMMENT: "Shaman" likely refers to the call sign for HUR officer Ihor Polonsky. It is unclear if "Shaman's" unit and the Kraken unit are the same.) Vova criticized UAF leadership for insisting on sending a "combat element" to the front lines in Bakhmut without proper command and control, noting that the UAF needed clear control on the ground and that the Kraken unit has demonstrated that it has enough power and resources to establish it.



(U) 3/00/122312-23

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)

Ukraine Learns of Alleged Russian Plot to "Throw" So-Called Special Military Operation By 5 March

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) Ukrainian Presidential Office Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak on 17 February learned of an alleged Russian plot to "throw" the so-called "special military operation," presumably in an attempt to sabotage Russian President Vladimir Putin. According to Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian Parliament) member Yelyzaveta Bohutska, who received the information from an unidentified Russian source with access to Kremlin officials, Russia planned to divert resources from Taganrog, Russia to Mariupol, Ukraine and focus its attention on the southern front. According to Bohutska's source, the plan for "the offensive" (no further information) was suspected to be a strategy devised by Russian National Security





NEAR EAST

(S//NF) ISRAEL/PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES: VIOLENCE INTENSIFIES

Ongoing unrest in the West Bank will probably continue to intensify and put at risk an agreement the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority reached in Al 'Aqabah, Jordan, on 26 February to reduce tension. After the parties signed the agreement—which included commitments to deescalate and address key issues, including Israeli unilateral raids into the West Bank—Israeli settlers attacked Huwwarah village near Nablus in the northern West Bank in response to a Palestinian killing two Israelis there earlier that day. On 27 February, an unidentified shooter killed an Israeli-American citizen near Jericho. Israeli and Palestinian Authority operations to locate Palestinian militants in the West Bank are ongoing, and additional Israeli settler and Palestinian reprisals are likely in the coming days.

- The continuing violence is likely to put pressure on Jerusalem to abandon the deal reached in Al 'Aqabah. Israeli officials will probably regard the recent Palestinian attacks as justification acting unilaterally and without notice to the Palestinian Authority.
- HAMAS blamed the Israeli Government for the settler violence and warned of unspecified consequences for policies supporting the building of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Militant groups in the Gaza Strip are probably considering responding to Israeli-instigated violence by launching small-scale rocket attacks into Israel.

(Near East EU, 28 Feb)

(S//HCS-P//OC-USGOV/NF) JORDAN/CHINA/US: AMMAN FACING PRESSURE FROM THE PRC IN 5G DECISION

Jordanian Crown Prince Hussein, who is leading Jordan's 5G wireless technology effort, is wavering on Amman's assurance to Washington that its mobile network operators will not choose Huawei for their 5G networks, almost certainly because he is worried about the possibility of the PRC retaliating against Jordan's economy. In mid-February, Hussein said that while he and Jordanian King Abdallah II prefer to keep Huawei out of Jordan's 5G networks, Jordan needs financial assistance to close the gap between Huawei and a non-Huawei vendor.

(Near East EU, 28 Feb)

(TS//SI//OC/NF) SYRIA: ISIS SENIOR LEADER KILLED IN SYRIA

On 24 February, ISIS senior leader and global administrator Abu Sara was reportedly killed in Syria. Abu Sara led ISIS's General Directorate of Provinces and influenced its strategy, personnel assignments, and most sensitive global operations. *J2 Assessment*: Abu Sara's removal very likely will disrupt ISIS's global cohesion, security, and financial transfers for at least the next 3 months. ISIS likely will rely on its archived institutional knowledge and a new leadership cadre who lack extensive relationships with the group's legacy senior leaders.
(DIA Intel Update, 28 Feb)

RUSSIA, EUROPE, & EURASIA

(TS//SI-G//OC/NF) RUSSIA/MOLDOVA/TURKEY: PLANNING FOR DESTABILIZATION OF MOLDOVA CONTINUES

At least some figures behind Russian plotting against Moldova intend to continue their efforts despite recent public revelations about their activities. The general director of the Russian private military company Vagacy Strategy Services coordinated with an employee of Wagner-linked influence group, "The Farm," in mid-February to adjust their planning for likely destabilization activities in Moldova.

- The organizers originally planned to hold protest training in Turkey from 24 to 28 February but changed the location to an unspecified special training center in Russia because of travel restrictions and Turkish intelligence attention on Russian males. They also extended the total training time to one to two months.
- The employees said that more than 150 participants would attend the protest training, which would include lessons on starting protests, security service reaction to riots, first aid, and psychological training for what to do if caught. (Russia-Ukraine EU, 28 Feb)

(S//NF) RUSSIA/UKRAINE: BATTLEFIELD UPDATE

Russian forces made minor territorial gains around Bakhmut yesterday and continued to press Ukrainian forces elsewhere in the region, even as Ukraine expanded its access to key supply lines running westward out of the city. Separately, Russia conducted one-way UAV attacks against targets near Kyiv and Zhytomyr—all of which Ukraine claimed it intercepted—and against a Ukrainian military unit in western Ukraine, which killed two and injured three.
(Russia-Ukraine EU, 28 Feb)

(TS//SI-G//OC/NF) **RUSSIA/UKRAINE: FSB CLAIMS DEFENSE MINISTRY UNDERREPORTING RUSSIAN CASUALTIES**

Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) accused the Defense Ministry of obfuscating Russian casualties in Ukraine, highlighting the continuing reluctance of military officials to convey bad news up the chain of command. On 21 February, FSB officials claimed the Defense Ministry was excluding the deaths of soldiers fighting with the Russian National Guard, Wagner, Chechen leader Kadyrov's mercenaries, and other unofficial organizations. They calculated the actual number of Russians wounded and killed in action was closer to 110,000.

- The combination of high casualties, particularly along the Bakhmut axis, and inability to recruit more prisoners will probably force Wagner to draw down offensive operations after its eventual capture of Bakhmut.
- Wagner remains barred from restarting its recruiting of Russian prisoners and the company continues to struggle to replace losses via other recruitment pipelines.

(Russia-Ukraine EU, 28 Feb)

(TS//SI-G//OC/NF/FISA) **RUSSIA/BELARUS/UKRAINE: SBU CHAIRMAN CLAIMS BELARUSIAN OPPOSITION CONDUCTED STRIKE ON RUSSIAN AIRCRAFT**

As of 27 February, Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) Chairman Malyuk claimed that, although the SBU had wanted to strike a Russian A-50 AWACS in Belarus, Belarusian partisans conducted the strike. Malyuk assured Ukrainian President Zelenskyy and Presidential Office Chief of Staff Yermak prior to the strike that, if no Belarusian was harmed, the strike would be seen as legitimate sabotage directed at the Russians. Zelenskyy and Yermak, however, were concerned an SBU strike would give Belarusian President Lukashenka a reason to join Russia's war against Ukraine. After the aircraft was struck, Malyuk claimed a local Belarusian opposition figure decided on his own to strike the aircraft. (Z-G/00/121322-23)

(TS//HCS-P//SI-G//OC/NF/FISA) **RUSSIA/UKRAINE: NATIONAL GUARD PERSONNEL SHORTAGES IMPEDE OCCUPATION PLANS**

Russian National Guard personnel shortfalls in Ukraine will probably hinder Moscow's attempts to fully secure all of its annexed territories. In August, the Russian National Guard had at least 27,500 troops in Ukraine and has since suffered significant personnel losses. National Guard units have taken on numerous additional missions to hold territory behind the frontline of Russian forces in Ukraine, amplifying their personnel needs. (WIRe2023-01665)

(TS//SI-G//OC/NF/FISA) **RUSSIA: UN SECRETARY GENERAL ACCOMMODATING RUSSIA TO PRESERVE GRAIN DEAL**

UN Secretary General Guterres is taking steps to accommodate Russia in an effort to protect the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), which he considers a pivotal UN success and key to addressing global food insecurity, and his actions are undermining broader efforts to hold Moscow accountable for its actions in Ukraine. In early February, he urged Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov in a letter to renew the BSGI before its term expires on 18 March and Guterres emphasized his efforts to improve Russia's ability to export, even if that involves sanctioned Russian entities or individuals, according to FISA-derived signal intelligence. (WIRe2023-00815)

(S//NF) **EU/UK: REACH AGREEMENT ON NORTHERN IRELAND**

The agreement between the European Commission and the UK Government yesterday to modify the contentious Northern Ireland Protocol paves the way for improved relations between the UK and the EU, but it might fall short of restoring the Northern Ireland Executive. UK Prime Minister Sunak and European Commission President von der Leyen agreed to the Windsor Framework, which includes easing customs and regulatory checks on some goods moving between Great Britain and Northern Ireland and creating a greater role for the Northern Ireland government to weigh in on changes to EU laws affecting Northern Ireland.

- Northern Ireland Democratic Unionist Party leader Jeffrey Donaldson is probably inclined to accept the agreement, but hardliners in his party may hold him back.
- If the Democratic Unionist Party rejects the framework, the UK Government will probably call new elections in Northern Ireland—in the hope that moderate unionist voters punish Democratic Unionist Party intransigence—rather than jeopardize the agreement with the EU. (EU-UK EU, 28 Feb)

AFRICA

(U//FOUO) **NIGERIA: INEC ANNOUNCES LEAD FOR RULING PARTY CANDIDATE, CONTINUES VOTE COUNTING**

On 27 February, Nigeria's Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) continued counting votes from the 25 February presidential election and said so far ruling party candidate Tinubu had won 3.8 million votes and six states, opposition candidate Atiku had won 3 million votes and five states, and candidate Obi had won 1.6 million votes and three states, according to OSE reporting. Additionally, Tinubu publicly accepted his loss of Lagos State, where he had been governor from 1999 to 2007, to Obi. (CIA Intel Update, 28 Feb; EUW2023022805090399)

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) **BURKINA FASO/COTE D'IVOIRE/MALI/
RUSSIA: ABIDJAN ASSESSES THREAT OF VAGNER PRESENCE ACROSS
BORDER; VAGNER STRENGTH IN MALI GROWS**

On 13 February, an Ivorian Ministry of Interior and Security official assessed Russian private military company Vagner could use its presence in Burkina Faso and Mali to destabilize Cote d'Ivoire, according to signals intelligence. Separately, on 26 February, a Vagner employee reported to an associate the total number of Vagner contractors located in Mali had risen to 1,645. (CIA Intel Update, 28 Feb; 3/50/120952-23; 3/50/121089-23)

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

(S//NF) **BOLIVIA: PRESIDENT WEAKENING DEMOCRACY**

President Luis Arce is sidelining human rights observers, imprisoning opposition figures, and manipulating the timing of Bolivia's census to consolidate his political power and prevent competitive elections, accelerating democratic erosion in the country. Arce, who was handpicked by party heavyweight former President Morales, garnered support from his own faction within the Movement Toward Socialism and is probably taking these steps to shore up the party's dominance before elections in October 2025. Arce may be willing to curb future attempts to neuter the opposition if the US pressed him or Brazilian President Lula reached out to him, but Arce would probably resist reversing the steps he has already taken. (WIRe2023-02046)

CYBER

(S//NF) **CHINA: SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT IN DOD SUPPLY CHAINS**

Chinese state-owned video surveillance equipment maker Hikvision, which partners with Chinese intelligence entities, is using relationships with resellers to disguise its products for sale to government suppliers, which probably is creating vectors for Beijing to compromise DoD networks. This is consistent with DIA's October 2019 assessment that Hikvision products—banned by the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act—probably would persist in DoD supply chains because of the company's efforts to mask its exports to retain access to US and allies' markets. As of January 2023, white-labeled Hikvision products were still available to US Government customers. (DIA F 24NYH A)

(U//FOUO) The below information is current as of 1200 ET/1700Z.

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(U) RUSSIA/UKRAINE

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY)

Russian GOU Provides Targeting Information for Oil Storage Facility for Potential Strikes

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) The Russian 3rd Directorate, Main Operations Directorate on 27 February provided targeting information for an oil storage facility and Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) equipment in Krivyi Rih, Ukraine that would be potentially struck on an unspecified date. The provided targeting information included the oil storage facility as well as UAF equipment located nearby. Additionally, a Russian Ministry of Defense official requested orders, further reconnaissance, and that the target coordinates be relayed to the Battlefield Command Group to destroy the target.

(U) G/RG/121340-23

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY)

Russian GOU Reports Successful Operational Masking Operations in Belarus Against Ukraine

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) The Russian Main Operations Directorate (GOU) reported successful operational masking efforts in Belarus against Ukraine between 3 and 10 February. The officials claimed they successfully convinced Ukrainian intelligence services of the possibility of a joint Russian-Belarusian offensive to occur from Belarusian territory. A Russian GOU official based this conclusion on a Russian Foreign Intelligence Service report on Ukrainian reactions to the deployment of Russian 6th Air Force and Air Defense Army units to airfields in Belarus, layering of air defense systems, transfer of Iskander-M divisions to Belarus and changing the focus of training activities from defensive to offensive. The Ukrainian Armed Forces reportedly considered the rotation of Russian military units and subunits of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (MSD) 1st Tank Army with the 6th MSD 3rd Army Corps as an attempt to covertly prepare combat-ready groups for rapid deployment in the Volynsk axis to disrupt support from Western countries. The Russian GOU recommended two phases of activity to further mislead Ukrainian forces about the possibility of offensive operations from Belarusian territory. The first phase would last until 6 March and the second from 6 to 11 March and plans for the two phases were being sent to the Belarusian Chief of General Staff for approval.

(U) G/OO/121249-23

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Russian PMC Vagner to Resume Recruitment, Seek Medical Services for Project 42174 Prisoners

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Russian private military company (PMC) Vagner planned in mid-February to resume its recruitment of prisoners for Project 42174, which is an ongoing Vagner effort to recruit, train, and integrate Russian convicts into Vagner units operating in Ukraine. Additionally, senior Vagner members would be dispatched to 70 prisoner unidentified distribution points in support of these efforts; meanwhile, the Russian Ministry of Defense was reportedly recalling its own recruiters from these locations. This planning occurred in tandem with attempts by senior Vagner members to address the disparities between the treatment of Vagner contractors wounded-in-action (WIA) and Project 42174 fighters WIA. Senior Vagner officials continued to advocate for equal treatment in regard to medical services rendered, while also updating the terms of the Project 42174 contracts to better address issues related to the WIA.

(U) 3/OO/121297-23

(TS//SI//NF) CHINA: PROBABLY DEVELOPING CYBER ATTACK CAPABILITIES THAT WILL THREATEN WESTERN SATELLITE SYSTEMS

42

The IC assesses China is developing cyber-attack capabilities to deny, exploit, and hijack satellite links and networks as part of its strategy to control information, which it considers a key warfighting domain. China's ability to infiltrate a core network or mimic a specific command link could allow it to seize control of a satellite, rendering it ineffective to support communications, weapons, or intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. (CIA-DA-IA-2023-01779)

TOP SECRET//SI-GAMMA//ORCON/NOFORN/FISA
(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY)

43

Russian Officials Consider Response to Mogul Prigozhin's Public Accusations Regarding Munitions

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) Following a slew of public accusations from Russian mogul Yevgeniy Prigozhin in which he claimed his private military company (PMC) Wagner forces in Ukraine were not receiving munitions from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), MoD officials in mid- to late February were considering what actions to take in response. The officials initially noted that, if the MoD was going to try to counter Prigozhin's public statements, they should find allies of equal status to fight Prigozhin rather than doing so itself; however, they were ultimately unsure how the MoD could successfully fight an information war with Prigozhin if the Russian government did not forbid Prigozhin from making public releases. The MoD officials also noted they could not decisively say whether or not Wagner was receiving munitions, acknowledging that Prigozhin's claims could be legitimate. They noted that Wagner's munitions were not distributed directly from the MoD but instead through the Grouping of Troops (Forces) in Bakhmut, Ukraine. Some MoD officials eventually proposed doubling the munitions supply to Wagner and then release public messaging of that fact. Later, Wagner affiliate Vladislav Andriyevskiy on 22 February indicated that Prigozhin was called into a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu, presumably that day. (COMMENT: The meeting almost certainly concerned, at least in part, Prigozhin's public accusations and resulting tension with Shoygu.) Separately, Federal Security Service officials in late February determined that Wagner's requests for munitions were fulfilled—though not in full—through 11 February; however, on 12 February Chief of the General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov reportedly ordered a stop to munitions supplies for Wagner and also to planned military transport flights, which were set to transport munitions designated for Wagner to Rostov-na-Donu, Russia.

(U) 6/00/121475-23

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Russian Embassy in Austria Officials Claim U.S. Preventing Peace Talks in Ukraine

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Aleksandr Zhuravlev, deputy director of the Russian Science and Culture Center in Austria and a second secretary at the Russian Embassy in Austria, made light of the Austrian government's decision to expel four Russian officials in early February and claimed the U.S. was preventing peace talks in Ukraine. Zhuravlev on 18 February noted that he agreed with the lighthearted assessment of his colleague, Moscow-based Sergey Sorokin, that the Austrian expulsion of four Russian officials met the Austrian expulsion quota for the year. Sorokin recalled that Austria also expelled four Russians in 2022. Zhuravlev reported that he believed Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Schallenberg was "scrutinizing" the Russians in Austria. He also reported rumors that stated the conflict in Ukraine reached a point where Ukraine and Russia decided to "forget it," put things on hold, and negotiate, but that "the Americans" were not allowing anyone to talk with the Russians. Zhuravlev and Sorokin also noted that the exchange rate for U.S. dollars (USDs) on the black market in Russia was not terrible since one could buy \$1.00 for between 77 and 80 Russian rubles (between \$1.05 and \$1.09). Official bank rates were apparently not as favorable and USDs were hard to find in Moscow.

(U) 3/21/121393-23

(TS//SI-G//OC/NF/FISA)

SBU Chairman Claims Strike on Russian A-50 Aircraft in Belarus Conducted By Belarusian Opposition

(TS//SI-G//OC/NF/FISA) Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) Chairman Vasyl Malyuk in late February claimed that although the SBU wanted to strike a Russian A-50 AWACS in Belarus, possibly an SBU agent in Belarus conducted the strike on 26 February despite Malyuk's order not to do so. Malyuk was initially planning to strike the aircraft with an anti-missile system, but instead delivered combat UAVs to the area, noting that SBU had an agent there. He assured Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Presidential Office Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak prior to the strike that, if no Belarusians were harmed, the strike would be seen as legitimate sabotage directed at the Russians. Zelenskyy and Yermak, however, were concerned that an SBU strike would give Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka a reason to join Russia's war against Ukraine. After the aircraft was struck, Malyuk claimed that it was an agent in Belarus—possibly the SBU agent Malyuk previously referenced—who decided on his own to strike the aircraft. Malyuk assured Zelenskyy and Yermak that the SBU was ordered not to strike it and likely could not be connected to the strike.

(U) 2-G/00/121322-23

(U) RUSSIA

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Russian PMC Wagner Officials Pursue Weapons Procurements from Turkey, Belarus, PRC, Syria

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Russian private military company (PMC) Wagner arranged in early February for a meeting between Wagner personnel and Turkish contacts to coordinate the purchase of Turkish weapons and equipment, likely for use in Mali, Ukraine, or both. Wagner coordinated with Turkish contacts to send five affiliates to Ankara, Turkey, seeking to obtain UAVs (including quadcopters), EW systems, counter-battery systems, howitzer artillery, and optical instruments. Wagner's Turkish contacts revealed the inability to export some requested weapons and equipment, such as howitzers, counter-battery systems, and certain unspecified counter-drone weapons. According to Prigozhin affiliates, Malian Transition President Assimi Goita was involved in efforts to acquire weapons from Turkey for Wagner's interests. Additionally, Wagner personnel sought munitions and equipment in early 2023 from Belarus, the PRC, and Syria. Belarus already delivered 50 percent of unspecified weapons promised as of early January and offered in late January to send 300,000 VOG-17 grenade launcher rounds. The PRC had not sent Wagner any weapons, not even for testing, and had no contact with Wagner regarding weapons deliveries as of early January. Finally, Wagner purchased six SPG-9 grenade launchers and 180 grenades in Syria on Prigozhin's orders, but personnel were uncertain where they would be sent beyond Syria.

(U) 3/00/121157-23

(U) CHINA

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)

PRC Foreign Affairs Officials Characterize International Reaction to HAB Incident as Impartial

(TS//SI-G//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) PRC foreign affairs officials in February characterized the international community's reaction to the high-altitude balloon (HAB) incident as impartial and advised PRC diplomatic missions to counter perceived U.S. efforts to escalate the issue and influence public opinion. Although some countries reportedly took sides regarding the incident, the officials indicated that countries generally were more concerned about the stability of the PRC-U.S. relationship, which the international community allegedly criticized as being weak. The officials maintained that the HAB was a civilian air vehicle that did not pose a threat and that the U.S. response was an overreaction, claiming that the U.S. sought to sensationalize the incident to undermine the PRC. To prevent this, the foreign affairs officials recommended that PRC diplomatic missions clarify the alleged facts of the incident, expose U.S. hypocrisy by citing instances of U.S. surveillance operations, and highlight the impact of domestic U.S. politics on the U.S. response to the HAB.

(U) G/00/121516-23

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA)

German MoD Rejects Deeper Cooperation With PRC Until PRC Becomes More Transparent

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY/FISA) The German Federal Ministry of Defense (MoD)'s Policy Directorate on 20 February hosted Defense Staff Talks with its PRC counterpart in Berlin. The Chief of the German MoD's Policy Division responsible for defense relations with the PRC asserted that Germany and the PRC agreed to hold another joint seminar at the German Federal Academy of Security Policy in Berlin and to work toward cooperative military assistance in support of the UN. The Germans, however, made clear to the PRC delegation that no further defense cooperation would be possible until Beijing became more open and transparent. The Germans were aware that the PRC was waging "a charm offensive" in Europe in the face of heavy U.S. pressure, and the Germans believed that they maintained solidarity with the U.S. by refusing more significant defense cooperation with the PRC. Separately, the German MoD sought to establish similar Staff Talks with the Indian MoD between 2020 and 2022, but to no avail.

(U) 3/00/121295-23

J) NEAR EAST

45

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Huthi Spokesman Receives Update on Saudi Negotiating Positions

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Huthi spokesman Muhammad Abd-al-Salam in mid-February received an update on Saudi negotiating positions with the Huthis. This update included directives from Saudi Ambassador to Yemen Muhammad Al Jabir to examine two options for the payment of Yemeni salaries that would exclude paying Huthi military salaries. The first option would be to pay public sector salaries based on the 2014 rosters for both Huthi- and Republic of Yemen-controlled areas for 2 months during the initial phase of a cease-fire agreement. The rest of the employees would receive payment during the "second phase," and these payments would begin during the fourth month of sovereign state revenues. For the second option, the Saudis could pay half of the salaries of public sector employees based on the 2014 budget during the initial phase. Once the Joint Economic Steering Committee completed determining Yemeni sovereign revenues and its review of employee rosters, full salary payments would be provided for all employees. Abd-al-Salam learned that because the Saudis expected the Huthis to make additional demands regardless of what proposal the Saudis presented to them, the Saudis were preparing a variety of different options for the proposal. A Huthi intelligence source apparently assessed that if the Huthis issued a "strong statement," it would increase pressure on the Saudis, as the Saudis intended to drag out negotiations and avoid making firm commitments. The consultant warned that the Huthis' patience was "misunderstood," and that the Saudis hoped to gradually decrease Huthi demands based on the belief that the Huthis were under pressure and in need of a détente on humanitarian issues before the beginning of Ramadan on 22 March.

(U) 3/00/121184-23

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

Jordanian Government Officials, Orange Telecommunications Representatives Discuss 5G Bids

(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) A Jordanian Royal Hashemite Court official exchanged updates on 26 February with a representative from the Orange Jordan telecommunications company on the status of Orange Jordan's selection of a provider for its rollout of 5G infrastructure in Jordan. According to the Orange Jordan representative, the bids they received from Ericsson and Nokia were \$61 to \$62 million higher than the bid they received from Chinese technology company Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Furthermore, Nokia had not bridged the gap in bids for Orange Jordan as it had reportedly done for Jordanian telecommunications provider Zain. A likely Jordanian intelligence official was working to reduce the bid disparity and negotiate compensation with Ericsson and Nokia. The Orange Jordan representative remained optimistic that the disparity in bids could be reduced and that a solution would be found. Additionally, Jordanian government officials met the previous week to form a task force to handle matters related to the 5G bids, and additional meetings took place with the participation of the Jordanian Minister of Justice and the Jordanian Telecommunications Regulatory Commission to discuss the legal framework of related matters. The Orange CEO planned to meet with Ericsson representatives in Spain later that week.


(U) 3/55/121356-23


(U) AFRICA

(TS//SI-G//OC/NF/FISA)

UN Secretary-General Reveals in Successful AU Summit

(TS//SI-G//OC/NF/FISA) UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres in mid-February revealed in what he considered a successful AU Summit. Guterres on 19 February updated the UN Deputy Secretary-General (DSG) on his perceived successes with regards to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, and Kenya, among other issues. In addition, Guterres and the DSG conversed about Africa and the Americas, the EU, Ukraine, Russia, Syria, Afghanistan, the G20, and climate change. Regarding the DRC, Guterres claimed that he managed to reconcile the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC and DRC President Felix Tshisekedi. Guterres claimed that Tshisekedi loved his presentation to the AU Peace and Security Council, which Guterres followed up with separate meetings with Rwandan President Paul Kagame and Kenyan President William Ruto to further advance discussions on the DRC. Guterres added that Tshisekedi trusted Angolan President Joao Lourenco, but that Tshisekedi did not trust Ruto. Tshisekedi apparently wanted the mediation to be led by Angola but





I really can't find any more
Thank you for loving the 4th Reich Minister of Rice Soup so far

4y3g

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One

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NICE지키미

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34 total comments


registrat...n
order

not cute 


Coburger review



I'm going to the dark

yep 

Uh oh, why are you being dragged to Namsan?

yep 

He was a good soldier.