Lucca 03/01/2023 4:11 AM

Ongoing unrest in the West Bank will probably continue to intensify and pu
agreement the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority reached in Al 'Aqabah, Jordan,
on 26 February to reduce tension. After the parties signed the agreement—which included
commitments to deescalate and address key issues, including Israeli unilateral raids into the
West Bank—Israeli settlers attacked Huwwarah village near Nablus in the northern West Bank
in response to a Palestinian killing two Israelis there earlier that day. On 27 February, an
unidentified shooter killed an Israeli-American citizen near Jericho. Israeli and Palestinian
Authority operations to locate Palestinian militants in the West Bank are ongoing, and
additional Israeli settler and Palestinian reprisals are likely in the coming days.

- The continuing violence is likely to put pressure on Jerusalem to abandon the deal reached in Al 'Aqabah. Israeli officials will probably regard the recent Palestinian attacks as justification acting unilaterally and without notice to the Palestinian Authority.
- HAMAS blamed the Israeli Government for the settler violence and warned of unspecified consequences for policies supporting the building of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Militant groups in the Gaza Strip are probably considering responding to Israeli-instigated violence by launching small-scale rocket attacks into Israel.

(Gaza Strip S//, 28 Feb)

(S//FHCS-P//OC-USGOV/NF) JORDAN/CHINA/US: AMMAN FACING PRESSURE FROM THE PRC IN 5G DECISION

Jordanian Crown Prince Hussein, who is leading Jordan's 5G wireless technology effort, is
wavering on Amman's assurance to Washington that its mobile network operators will not
choose Huawei for their 5G networks, almost certainly because he is worried about the
[illegible] February, Hussein said that
[illegible] networks







LY DEVELOPING CYBE
ERN SATELLITE SYSTE
cyber-attack capabilities to
ategy to control information
to infiltrate a core network
atellite, rendering it ineffec
te, and reconnaissance syst



ICOD: 01 0200 EST March 2023
Updated every workday
PCN: DIA_F_24OLX_A

DAYS SINCE START OF CONFLICT **D+370**

Russia/Ukraine | Status of the Conflict as of 1 Mar (S//RELIDO)

As of 1 Mar, Russian (RUS) and PMC Vagner forces continued to focus on seizing Bakhmut, while the UAF consolidated gains IVO Kherson and reinforced defenses IVO Bakhmut to protect its remaining GLOC from potential RUS advances in eastern Ukraine (UKR). RUS forces continued ground operations in Donetsk and were establishing a defense-in-depth between Kherson and Zaporizhzhia; the Central and Western Groupings of Troops (GoTs) were IVO Bakhmut and Kreminna, while the Southern and Eastern GoTs were IVO Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts. (TS//SI//NF)

GROUND

27 Feb: The UAF reported that PMC Vagner seized three platoon-sized fighting positions IVO Bakhmut (S//REL TO USA, FIN, SWE, UKR, FVEY, NATO)

26 Feb: Security Service of UKR (SBU) officials assessed that its agents in Belarus violated orders and attacked a RUS A-50U aircraft at Machulishchi Airfield, Belarus (TS//SI-G//OC/NF)

MARITIME

27 Feb: Two RUS BLKFLT surface vessels are scheduled to perform torpedo firing exercises on 3 Mar (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

AIR/AIR DEFENSE

28 Feb: A RUS A-50U at Machulishchi Airfield, Belarus sustained minor damage to its rotodome following the 26 Feb quadcopter attack (S//REL TO USA, FIN, SWE, FVEY, NATO)

28 Feb: RUS officials reported that UKR forces attempted to strike a gas compression station in Moscow's suburbs with a UAV (U)

SPACE/CYBER/EW

26 Feb: RUS Aerospace Forces assessed it successfully diverted a UKR missile from its intended course due to employment of electronic warfare equipment (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)

POLITICAL/MISCELLANEOUS

28 Feb: *RUS President Putin signed a law that allows the Kremlin to suspend the disclosure of official RUS statistics* (U)

28 Feb: Belgium reported that it is unwilling to donate aircraft to UKR but will consider providing maintenance and logistic aid for other countries' deliveries (S//NF)

All: (TS//HCS-P/SI-G/TK//FGI/RS/OC/NF/FISA)
Map ICOD: 01 0200 EDT MAR 2023

Ukrainian Forces

Maneuver: 34 BDEs | **Fires: 13 Units**

Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) : 27 BDEs

Russian Battalion (BN) Count

Potential Maximum Combat Power: 544 BNs**

Committed to Conflict: 527 of 544 BNs (97%)

	Regular MVR BNs	Reserve BNs	Auxiliary* BNs	Total
Committed	218	41	268	527

Located Inside UKR: 474 of 527 BNs (90% of Committed)

	Regular MVR BNs	Reserve BNs	Auxiliary BNs	Total
Combat Effective	94 (+1)	29	241	364
Deployed Combat Ineffective	72	11	27	110
Total	166	40	268	474

TOTAL ASSESSED LOSSES

RUSSIA
Assessed Combat Sustainability: MODERATE
- 35.5k–43.5k KIA
- 72 fighter/bomber; 82 rotary-wing
- 6,004 ground vehicles

UKRAINE
Assessed Combat Sustainability: MODERATE
- 16k–17.5k KIA
- 60 fighter/bomber; 32 rotary-wing
- 11 strategic SAMs; 34 tactical SAMs



COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALIONS (BNs)

94 Regular MVR BNs | 29 Reserve BNs | 241 AUX* BNs

Eastern Grouping of Troops
16 Regular MVR BNs | 9 Reserve BNs | 10 AUX BNs

Central Grouping of Troops
14 Regular MVR BNs | 7 Reserve BNs | 10 AUX BNs

Western Grouping of Troops
14 (+1) Regular MVR BNs | 5 Reserve BNs | 47 AUX BNs

Southern Grouping of Troops
46 Regular MVR BNs | 5 Reserve BNs | 174 AUX BNs

FORCE ECHELON
II Battalion; III Regiment/group; X Brigade; XX Division; XXX Corps; XXXX Army

FORCE UNIT SYMBOLOGY
Airborne infantry; Air defense (long range); Armor; Artillery (self-propelled); Assault infantry (mountain); Assault landing; C2; CBRN; Electronic warfare; Engineers; Infantry; Motorized rifle; Multiple rocket launcher; Naval infantry; Reconnaissance; SAMs; SRGNT; MTO; Mechanized infantry; Missile

FORCES & AOIs
Russian forces; Russian reserve forces; Combat effective auxiliary forces; Deployed combat ineffective forces; Deployed combat ineffective reserve forces; Deployed combat ineffective Auxiliary; Contested areas; Russian-controlled territory; Russian-occupied pre-invasion; Ukrainian forces; Ukrainian reserve forces; Ukrainian force concentrations (last 48 hours); High-explosive events (last 24 hours); Airfield; Bridge; Nuclear plant

*Auxiliary (AUX) includes Russia-led Forces (RLF), Territorial Defense Forces (TDF), and PMC Vagner BNs

**Maximum RUS combat power includes RUS' pre-conflict BN generation capability plus all auxiliary forces it has used in UKR

(U) Coordinated with DIA (EERC)

(U) Note: Updated items in blue

Classified By: Director for Intelligence
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 50X1-HUM

Russia/Ukraine Joint Staff J3/4/5 Daily Update (D+370)

Orders and Decisions

- Last 24: None
- Currently Pending: None

SIGACT / CCIR

- RUS/UKR NECs: 8x NECs, 17x non-threat missile launches; 5,273x total NECs

US Composition & Disposition-USEUCOM AOR

US Mil in USEUCOM: 92,038 / Afloat: 8,357 / Jasionka: 1,252

US Maritime Vessels	US Air Components	US Land Units
17x Surface Ships: • 1x Carrier, 8x CRUDES, 2x C2 ship, 6x Auxiliaries **5x Subs:** • 4x SSN, 1x SSGN	**9x FSs:** • 2x 5th Gen, 7x 4th Gen **BTF 23-2 (4x B-52s)** **2x Army CABs:** • 12th CAB, 1 AD CAB	**1x Corps:** V Corps **2x DIVs:** • 4 ID & 101st ABN DIV **5x Army BCTs:** • 2 SCR, 173rd IBCT, 2/1 ID, 2/1 CD, 2/101 IBCT

Composition Changes Next 72 Hours

Deployments	Redeployments	Projected Change (Air Mvmt)
-	-	+75 thru 4 Mar

Disposition Changes:
Sea: NSTR
Air: NSTR
Land: NSTR

Activities Last 24 Hours

SEA:

1. **GEORGE H.W. BUSH CSG:** U/W Adriatic Sea; FLOPS
   - OPS Sorties-72; Fixed Wing-55, Rotary Wing-15, COD-2
   - Reverse TOA from STRIKEFORNATO to USEUCOM with completion of NEPTUNE STRIKE

AIR:

2. **Airborne Sensitive Reconnaissance Ops (SRO)/ NATO ISR**
   - **BLK:** [1 Manned, 2 Unmanned] 1x RC-135V/W (GBR), 1x RQ-4, 1x MQ-9
   - **ROU:** [1 Manned, 2 Unmanned] 1x RC-135V/W (GBR), 2x MQ-9
   - **POL:** [1 Manned, 3 Unmanned] 1x RC-135V/W (GBR), 3x MQ-9
3. **Operation ATLAS GUARDIAN:** DoD-NATO supporting enhanced Vigilance Activities (eVA) and enhanced Air Policing (eAP): 15x US eAP CAP sorties complete (15x ASSURE: 0x SHIELD)

Alert 60 AEW: USAFE maintains Alert 60 AEW ISO Jasionka force protection from Powidz AB, POL

Legend
NATO Country
Non-NATO Country
Russia

US/NATO SOF in UKR
- USA 14x pax
- GBR 50x pax
- FRA 15x pax
- LVA 17x pax
- NLD 1x pax

Total: 97x pax

Total US Pax in UKR: 100

DoS Pax in UKR: 71

DoD Pax in UKR: 29 (Includes DAO, ODC, USSOF, and MSAU)



Activities Last 24 Hours Cont.

SAG-U

4. Conducting bilateral training with partner nations supporting key UKR efforts

V CORPS

5. **South East Flank Battle Groups (BG):** (POL, SVK, HUN, ROU, BGR): BGs conducted training with partner nations to deter RUS aggression
6. **Train & Advise UAF (UKR Armed Forces):**
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Activities Next 24-48 Hours

SEA:

1. **GEORGE H.W. BUSH CSG:** U/W Adriatic Sea; FLOPS
   - OPS Sorties-52, Fixed Wing-30, Rotary Wing-16, Ext-6

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3. **Operation ATLAS GUARDIAN:** 4x U.S. and 46x NATO missions scheduled for Eastern Flank Border CAPs

J5 Policy

Key Upcoming Engagements
- (T) 2 Mar: CJCS BILAT with ITA CHOD, MINDEF, and NSA-Equivalent in Rome
- (T) 6 Mar: CJCS BILAT with Spanish Military Leadership
- (T) 5 Apr: CJCJS o/c with BEL CHOD

J4 Logistics

GMLRS

Last 24hr Expended	Total Expended	OH	PDA Due in (Qty)	7-Day Burn Rate	DOS	ZERO (7 Day)
28	9,612	250	0	14	18	18-Mar

155mm Rounds

Last 24hr Expended	Total Expended	OH	PDA + USAI Due in (Qty) by 12 Mar	7-Day Burn rate	DOS (7 Day)	ZERO (7 Day)
1,104	952,856	9,788	30,000	2,746	4	4-Mar

PDA Deliveries

155mm Rounds/Charges/Fuzes/Primers
- Enroute: None
- Next 24 hrs: 1,840x 155mm HE (PDA32)

GMLRS
- Enroute: None
- Next 24 hrs: None

IDAM-ER
- Enroute: None
- Next 24 hrs: None

PATRIOT
- Enroute: None
- Next 24 hrs: None

Other
- Enroute: 5x MAXXPRO (PD22); 4 HMMWVs (PD23/28)
- Next 24 hrs: 21x CP-200 Phoenix Ghost (PD25) to Ramstein

Activities Next 24-48 Hours

AIR Cont:

Alert 60 AEW: USAFE maintains Alert 60 AEW ISO Jasionka force protection from Powidz AB, POL

LAND:

4. Conducting bilateral training with partner nations supporting key UKR efforts
5. **SE Flank BGs:** Conducts training with HN partner forces
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   (DEU): (STRYKER) BTG #6 Collective Training (2 Mar-28 Mar)

Russia/Ukraine Joint Staff J3/4/5 Daily Update (D+370)

Orders and Decisions

- Last 24: None
- Currently Pending: None

SIGACT / CCIR

- RUS/UKR NECs: 8x NECs, 17x non-threat missile launches; 5,273x total NECs

US Composition & Disposition-USEUCOM AOR

US Mil in USEUCOM: 52,018 / Afloat: 8,357 / Jasionka: 1,252

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17x Surface Ships:
- 1x Carrier, 8x CRUDES, 2x CG ship, 6x Auxiliaries

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9x FSs:
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BTF 23-2 (4x B-52s)
2x Army CABs:
- 12th CAB, 1 AD CAB

US Land Units
1x Corps: V Corps
2x DIVs:
- 4 ID & 101st ABN DIV

5x Army BCTs:
- 2 SCR, 173rd IBCT, 2/1 ID, 2/1 CD, 2/101 IBCT

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Deployments	Redeployments	Projected Change (Air Mvmt)
		+75 thru 4 Mar

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Legend

- NATO Country
- Non-NATO Country
- Russia

US/NATO SOF in UKR

- USA 14x pax
- GBR 50x pax
- FRA 15x pax
- LVA 17x pax
- NLD 1x pax

Total: 97x pax

Total US Pax in UKR: 100

DoS Pax in UKR: 71

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Activities Last 24 Hours Cont.

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Activities Next 24-48 Hours

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Bakhmut Axis

As of 01 0600 EST Mar 2023

D+370

Decisive Operation: Southwest Attack
- Task: Attack SW of Bakhmut
- Purpose: Defeat UAF
- Endstate: Encircle Bakhmut to the West, control Chasiv Yar
- Current FLOT: ~7 KM SE of Chasiv Yar

Shaping Operation 1: Northern Attack
- Endstate: Control all lines of communication (LOC) north of Bakhmut
- Current FLOT: ~2 KM north of Bakhmut

SO 2: Eastern Attack
- Endstate: Control all LOCs east of Bakhmut
- Current FLOT: ~1 KM east of Bakhmut

SO 3: Southern Attack
- Endstate: Control all LOCs south of Bakhmut
- Current FLOT: ~1 KM south of Bakhmut



Bakhmut Axis

RF: 35 Total MVR BNs ~29,000 Total Russian Personnel
~7,000 Regular/Res, RLF, and TDF
~22,000 PMC Vagner

10 Combat-Effective MVR BNs (regular and reserve)
0 Combat-Ineffective MVR BNs (regular and reserve)
15 Combat-Effective RLF BNs
10 Combat-Ineffective RLF BNs
0 Combat-Effective TDF BNs
0 Combat-Ineffective TDF BNs
12 Vagner PMC DETs

UAF: 12 BDEs (61 MVR BNs), ~15,250 – 30,500 Total Personnel


Assessed Operations in Kharkiv
As of 01 0600 EST Mar 2023
D+370
TOP SECRET//HCS-P/SI-G/TK//FGI//RSEN/ORCON/NOFORN
Kharkiv Axis
RF: 160 Total MVR BNs ~48,600 Total Personnel
37 Combat-Effective MVR BNs (regular and reserve)
44 Combat-Ineffective MVR BNs (regular and reserve)
40 Combat-Effective RLF BNs
1 Combat-Ineffective RLF BNs
38 Combat-Effective TDF BNs
2 Combat-Ineffective TDF BNs
DNR: 5 DDEs (19 MVR BNs) 7,250 – 14,500 Total Personnel
River/Waterway
Oblast boundary
Major road
Rail line
RUS FLOT
UKR FLOT
Contested
RF Combat Effective
RF Combat Ineffective
UAF
National/Assessed Location
City/Town
Minefield
RUS Defensive Line
RUS Emitters past 24
UKR Emitters past 24
0 10 20 Miles
0 10 20 Kilometers
Hrakove
Shevchenkove
Volokhiv Yar
Balaklia
Verbivka
Vesele
Bryhadrivka
Izyum
Kuplansk
Vilshana
Synkivka
Starovirvka
Kysylivka
Yahidne
Novoosynove
Kupiemivka
Kolomychykha
Borova
Pidlyman
Nyzhnia Zhuravka
Stepove
Izium
Makiivka
Novomykhailivka
Novosadove
Kolodiaz
Yampolivka
Terny
Ivanivka
Torske
Zarichne
Lyman
Dolyna
Raihorodok
Slovlansk
Raihorodka
Svatove
Karmazynivka
Chernechyna
Krasnorichenske
Ploshchanka
Chervonopopivka
Kremnnia
Dibrova
Siversk
Topolivka
Bilohorivka
Sievierodonetsk
Lysychansk
Verkhnokamianka
Spirne
Berestove
Myrna Dolyna
Starobilsk
Novoaidar
Luhans'Ka
Donets'Ka
Pg-8
1-4
TOP SECRET//HCS-P/SI-G/TK//FGI//RSEN/ORCON/NOFORN

Russia/Ukraine | Assessed Combat Sustainability and Attrition (S//RELIDO)

We have low confidence in Russian (RUS) and Ukrainian (UKR) attrition rates and inventories because of information gaps, OPSEC and IO efforts, and potential bias in UKR information sharing. Casualty assessments, which fluctuate depending on the source, are informed by RUS, Vagner, and UKR officials. In the below sustainability assessments, high indicates the forces can sustain operations across all domains, moderate indicates the forces have difficulty sustaining operations in one domain, and low indicates the forces are unable to sustain operations across multiple domains. (S//NF)

RUSSIA

Assessed Combat Sustainability: MODERATE

RUS continues to fall behind stated goals for the replenishment of equipment and personnel to support operations in Ukraine. RUS has also incorporated the use of older, less accurate, munition systems to overcome depletion of more modern system inventories.

Casualties

DIA Assessment
KIA: 35.5K–43K
WIA: 154K–180K
Total: 189.5K–223K

RUS MOD Public
KIA: 5,939
WIA: 3,825

Total RUS assets committed to UKR:

67% of Air Inventory (1,210 of 1,821)

37% of Naval Inventory (44 of 118)

		In-Garrison	In-Theater	Destroyed
Ground 63%				
Tanks	3,028	561	419	2,048
APCs/IFVs	10,786	3,958	2,928	3,900
Artillery	4,919	2,724	1,209	986
Air Defense 97%				
Strategic SAM BNs	75	60	15	0
Tactical SAM Units	3,307	3,052	158	97
Air 92%				
Fighter/ Fighter-bomber	696	139	485	72
Rotary-wing	1,125	472	572	81

UKRAINE

Assessed Combat Sustainability: MODERATE

UKR has sustained defensive and support operations with available inventories for over 6 months, despite losses in Air and Air Defense domains. UKR has also demonstrated the successful integration and implementation of provided Western systems.

Casualties

DIA Assessment
KIA: 15.5K–17.5K
WIA: 109K–113.5K
Total: 124.5K–131K

UKR MOD Public
KIA: 10,000-13,000
WIA: 10,000

Civilian Deaths
8,101 – 41,000
UNHCR Confirmed | Summary of Public Statements

		Storage	Fielded (Delivered)	Destroyed
Ground 83%				
Tanks	1,765	495	802 (433)	468
APCs/IFVs/ MRAPs	5,703	1,186	3,498 (1,806)	1020
Artillery	3,024	365	2,331 (794)	328
Air Defense 73%				
Strategic SAM BNs	38		27 (1)	11
Tactical SAM Units	128		94 (3)	34
Air 68%				
Fighter/ Fighter-bomber	145		85	60
Rotary-wing	139		107 (24)	32

The IC is revising its methodology on combat sustainability to incorporate reporting on equipment in Russia's garrisons and strategic reserves, equipment associated with Russian and Ukrainian reserve forces, and new calculations to incorporate captured and abandoned equipment. DIA will introduce this new methodology in a Combat Sustainability tabloid that will publish weekly in late February.

US, Allied & Partner UAF Combat Power Build

BLUF: Based on known contributions, training pathways, and projections, (12) combat credible BDEs can be generated for the Spring Counteroffensive, (3) internally by Ukraine [not depicted], and (9) are trained and equipped by US, Allied & Partner (US/A&P). Of the (9) BDEs, (6) BDEs will be ready by 31MAR, and the final (3) BDEs by 30APR. Equipment delivery times will impact training and readiness in order to meet this timeline. Total equipment required for (9) BDEs is 253 x Tanks, 381 x Mech, 480 x Motor, and 147 x Artillery plus delivery of 571 x U.S. Up-Armored HMMWVs.

Delivered, in country
Delivery on track
No Delivery timeline
No commitment

	Equipment* (details on 3-7s)	Delivery	Training	NOTES
5 BDE	90 x BMP (POL/CZE) 13 x T-64 (UKR) 17 x Tanks (XXX) 12 x AS-90 (GBR) 10 x 2S1 (UKR)	90/90 x On Hand 13/13 x On Hand [TBD] 17/17 x [TBD] Est. Delivery by APR 10/10 x On Hand	13 JAN-04 MAR FEB-MAR (UKR) 30 JAN-14MAR (GBR) [TBD] FEB-MAR (UKR)	**Training: 60% Complete** **Equipment: 79% On Hand** + Primarily POL trained and equipped - Short 17 Tanks; req. 122mm ammo
47 BDE	99 x M2 (US) 28 x T-55S (SLV) 12 x M109 (US) 12 x D-30 (UKR)	06-19MAR Train to Zamosc 28/28 x On Hand 12/12 x On Hand 12/12 x On Hand	15 JAN-29 MAR (US) Complete (UKR) 06 FEB-07 MAR (US) Complete (UKR)	**Training: 40% Complete** **Equipment: 40% On Hand** + Primarily US trained and equipped (M2 Bradleys) - Req. 122mm ammo
33 BDE	90 x MaxxPro (US) 14 x Leopard 2A6 (DEU) 4 x Leopard 2A4 (CAN) 14 x Leopard 2A4 (POL) 12 x M119 (US)	20x On Hand, 50 by MAR 14 x by APR (DEU) 18 x by APR (CAN) 14 x by MAR (POL) 12/12 x On Hand	06 FEB- 30 MAR (UKR) 06 FEB-18MAR 10 FEB-15MAR Complete (US)	**Training: 20% Complete** **Equipment: 32% On Hand** + Primarily US equipped (MaxxPro/MRAP) - Pending Leopard Delivery timeline
21 BDE	20 x CVRT (GBR) 30 x Senator (CAN) 20 x Bulldog, 21 Husky (GBR) and 10 x M113 (US) 30 x T-64 (UKR) 10 x FH70 ([illegible], ITA)	Est. Delivery by APR 30/30 x On Hand Est. Delivery by MAR 10/10 x On Hand 30/30 x On Hand 6 x (ITA) On Hand, [illegible] x [TBD]	06 -30 MAR (GBR) 06 MAR-30 MAR (UKR) 06 MAR-30 MAR (UKR) 06 - 30 MAR (UKR) 06 – 30 MAR (UKR)	**Training: 0% Complete** **Equipment: 38% On Hand** + Composite US/A&P - Pending armored motorized delivery
32 BDE	90 x MaxxPro (US) 10 x T-72 (NLD) 20 x Tanks (XXX) 12 x D-30 (EST)	63/90x On Hand, rest by MAR 10 x by APR [TBD] [TBD] 12/12 x On Hand	06 - 30 MAR (UKR) 06 - 30 MAR (UKR) 06 - 30 MAR (UKR) 06 - 30 MAR (UKR)	**Training: 0% Complete** **Equipment: 56% On Hand** + Primarily US equipped (MaxxPro) - Short 20 Tanks; req. 122mm ammo
37 BDE	30 x Mastiff/Husky (GBR) 30 x Mastiff/Wolf (GBR) 30 x Senator (CAN) 14 x AMX-10 (FRA) 16 x Tanks (XXX) 12 x D-30 (EST)	Est. Delivery by APR Est. Delivery by FEB [Committed, Delivery TBD] 9/14 x On Hand, rest by Mar [TBD] [TBD] [Committed, Delivery TBD]	01- 30 MAR (UKR) 01- 30 MAR (UKR) 01- 30 MAR (UKR) Complete (FRA) [TBD] FEB-MAR (UKR)	**Training: 10% Complete** **Equipment: 43% On Hand** + Composite US/A&P - Short 13 tanks; Pending motorized delivery; req. 122mm ammo; Limited AMX-10 ammo (120mm RB)
118 BDE	90 x M113 (US) 28 x T-72 (POL) 6 x M109 (US) 8 x FH-70 (EST)	90/90 x On Hand 28 x 3 APR 6 x 07 MAR 8 x Prior to APR	16 JAN – 30 MAR 16 JAN – 30 MAR (UKR) 27 FEB – 28 MAR (US) 26 FEB– 30 MAR (UKR)	**Training: 0% Complete** **Equipment: 65% On Hand** + Primarily US equipped (M113) - Pending Armor and Artillery delivery
117 BDE	28 x Viking (NLD) 20/10 x XA185/M113 30 x Senator (CAN) 31 x PT-91 (POL) 12 x D-30 (EST) 8 x AS90 (GBR)	28/28 x On Hand 20 x On Hand, 10 Est. by APR [Committed, Delivery TBD] 31 x 03 APR 10/12 x On Hand [Committed, Delivery TBD]	30 JAN – 29 MAR (UKR) 20 FEB – 30 MAR (FIN) [TBD] FEB-MAR (UKR) [TBD] FEB-MAR (UKR) 06 – 30 MAR (UKR) 06 – 30 MAR (GBR)	**Training: 0% Complete** **Equipment: 50% On Hand** + Composite A&P - Pending armored motorized delivery; req. 122mm ammo
82 BDE	90 x Stryker (US) 40 x Marder (DEU) 14 x Challenger (GBR) 24 x M119 (US)	90 x 06-10MAR to Dobra Training in DEU, Est. by APR Training in GBR, Est. by APR 24/24 x On Hand	20 FEB – 29 MAR (US) 05 FEB – APR (DEU) 30 JAN – 06 MAR (GBR) 20 FEB – 29 MAR (US)	**Training: 0% Complete** **Equipment: 14% On Hand** + Primarily US equipped (Stryker) - Limited Challenger 2 ammo, Pending Armor equipment delivery



3-7

Training Window | Equip/Trans Window | Armor/MGS | Mechanized | Motorized | Field Artillery | At Risk

Source: Wiesbaden 7.0, Building UAF Capability 07FEB23, USARCENT AP OPSUM 27FEB23, UAF_USAREUR SYNCHMAT 27FEB23, Daily Reference Card Statements

US, Allied & Partner UAF Combat Power Build

BLUF: Based on known contributions, training pathways, and projections, (12) combat credible BDEs can be generated for the Spring Counteroffensive, (3) internally by Ukraine [not depicted], and (9) are trained and equipped by US, Allied & Partner (US/A&P). Of the (9) BDEs, (6) BDEs will be ready by 31MAR, and the final (3) BDEs by 30APR. Equipment delivery times will impact training and readiness in order to meet this timeline. Total equipment required for (9) BDEs is 253 x Tanks, 381 x Mech, 480 x Motor, and 147 x Artillery plus delivery of 571 x U.S. Up-Armored HMMWVs.

Delivered, in country
Delivery on track
No Delivery Timeline
No commitment

	Equipment* (which or 5 %)	Delivery	Training	NOTES
3 BDE	90 x BMP (POL/CZE) 13 x T-64 (UKR) 17 x Tanks (XXX) 12 x AS-90 (GBR) 10 x 251 (UKR)	90/90 x On Hand 13/13 x On Hand [TBD] 17/17 x [TBD] Est. Delivery by APR 10/10 x On Hand	13 JAN-04 MAR FEB-MAR (UKR) 30 JAN-14MAR (GBR) [TBD] FEB-MAR (UKR)	**Training: 60% Complete** **Equipment: 79% On Hand** + Primarily POL trained and equipped - Short 17 Tanks; req. 122mm ammo
47 BDE	99 x M2 (US) 28 x T-55S (SLV) 12 x M109 (US) 12 x D-30 (UKR)	06-19MAR Train to Zamosc 28/28 x On Hand 12/12 x On Hand 12/12 x On Hand	15 JAN-29 MAR (US) Complete (UKR) 06 FEB-07 MAR (US) Complete (UKR)	**Training: 40% Complete** **Equipment: 40% On Hand** + Primarily US trained and equipped [M2 Bradleys] - Req. 122mm ammo
11 BDE	90 x MaxxPro (US) 14 x Leopard 2A6 (DEU) 4 x Leopard 2A4 (CAN) 14 x Leopard 2A4 (POL) 12 x M119 (US)	20x On Hand, 50 by MAR 14 x by APR (DEU) 18 x by APR (CAN) 14 x by MAR (POL) 12/12 x On Hand	06 FEB- 30 MAR (UKR) 06 FEB-18MAR 10 FEB-15MAR Complete (US)	**Training: 20% Complete** **Equipment: 32% On Hand** + Primarily US equipped (MaxxPro/MRAP) - Pending Leopard Delivery timeline
21 BDE	20 x CVRT (GBR) 10 x Senator (CAN) 10 x Bulldog, 21 Husky (GBR) and 10 x M113 (US) 30 x T-64 (UKR) 10 x FH70 (, ITA)	Est. Delivery by APR 30/30 x On Hand Est. Delivery by MAR 10/10 x On Hand 30/30 x On Hand 6 x [ITA] On Hand, 4x UKR	06 -30 MAR (GBR) 06 MAR-30 MAR (UKR) 06 MAR-30 MAR (UKR) 06 - 30 MAR (UKR) 06 – 30 MAR (UKR)	**Training: 0% Complete** **Equipment: 38% On Hand** + Composite US/A&P - Pending armored motorized delivery
32 BDE	90 x MaxxPro (US) 10 x T-72 (NLD) 20 x Tanks (XXX) 12 x D-30 (EST)	63/90x On Hand, rest by MAR 10 x by APR [TBD] [TBD] 12/12 x On Hand	06 - 30 MAR (UKR) 06 - 30 MAR (UKR) 06 - 30 MAR (UKR) 06 - 30 MAR (UKR)	**Training: 0% Complete** **Equipment: 36% On Hand** + Primarily US equipped (MaxxPro) - Short 20 Tanks; req. 122mm ammo
37 BDE	30 x Mastiff/Husky (GBR) 30 x Mastiff/Wolf (GBR) 30 x Sanger (CAN) 14 x AMX-10 (FRA) 16 x Tanks (XXX) 12 x D-30 (EST)	Est. Delivery by APR Est. Delivery by FEB [Committed, Delivery TBD] 9/14 x On Hand, rest by Mar [TBD] [TBD] [Committed, Delivery TBD]	01- 30 MAR (UKR) 01- 30 MAR (UKR) 01- 30 MAR (UKR) Complete (FRA) [TBD] FEB-MAR (UKR)	**Training: 10% Complete** **Equipment: 43% On Hand** + Composite US/A&P - Short 13 tanks; Pending motorized delivery; req. 122mm ammo; Limited AMX-10 ammo (120mm RB)
118 BDE	90 x M113 (US) 28 x T-72 (POL) 6 x M109 (US) 8 x FH-70 (EST)	90/90 x On Hand 28 x 5 APR 6 x 07 MAR 8 x Prior to APR	16 JAN – 30 MAR 16 JAN – 30 MAR (UKR) 27 FEB – 28 MAR (US) 26 FEB– 30 MAR (UKR)	**Training: 0% Complete** **Equipment: 65% On Hand** + Primarily US equipped (M113) - Pending Armor and Artillery delivery
117 BDE	28 x Viking (NLD) 20/10 x XA185/M113 10 x Bison (DEU) 31 x PT-91 (POL) 12 x D-30 (EST) 8 x Tanks (XXX)	28/28 x On Hand 20 x On Hand, 10 Est. by APR [Committed, Delivery TBD] 31 x 03 APR 10/12 x On Hand [Committed, Delivery TBD]	30 JAN – 29 MAR (UKR) 20 FEB – 30 MAR (FIN) [TBD] FEB-MAR (UKR) [TBD] FEB-MAR (UKR) 06 – 30 MAR (UKR) 06 – 30 MAR (GBR)	**Training: 0% Complete** **Equipment: 50% On Hand** + Composite A&P - Pending armored motorized delivery; req. 122mm ammo
82 BDE	90 x Stryker (US) 40 x Marder (DEU) 14 x Challenger (GBR) 24 x M119 (US)	90 x OB-10MAR to Dobra Training in DEU, Est. by APR Training in GBR, Est. by APR 24/24 x On Hand	20 FEB – 29 MAR (US) 05 FEB – APR (DEU) 30 JAN – 06 MAR (GBR) 20 FEB – 29 MAR (US)	**Training: 0% Complete** **Equipment: 14% On Hand** + Primarily US equipped (Stryker) - Limited Challenger 2 ammo, Pending Armor equipment delivery



3-7

Training Window | Equip/Trans Window | Armor/MGS | Mechanized | Motorized | Field Artillery | At Risk

Source: Wiesbaden 7.0, Building UAF Capability 07FEB23, US/A&P Stock Pile 23FEB23, UAF_USARCUR SYNCHMAT 23FEB23, Daily Reference Card Statements

@War_cube

Consolidated UAF Air Defense

BLUF: Current UKR Air Defense (AD) plan balances limited resources to protect critical national infrastructure (CNI), population centers, front line of troops (FLOT), and other key assets across Ukraine. UKRs ability to provide medium range air defense to protect the FLOT will be completely reduced by MAY 23. UKR assessed to withstand 2-3 more wave strikes. As 1st Layer Defense munitions run out, 2nd and 3rd Layer expenditure rates will increase, reducing the ability to defend against Russian aerial attacks from all altitudes.

Assessment

1. SA-10 and SA-11 **comprise 89%** of Ukraine's Air Defense medium/high-range, medium/high-range protection (>20,000 ft). Based on **current** interceptor consumption:
   - BUK (SA-11) will be completely depleted **by 31 MAR 2023**
   - S300 (SA-10) will have **be completely depleted by 02 MAY 2023**
2. AD systems with remaining interceptor inventory (SA-3, SA-12, NASAM, IRIS-T, etc.) **have a limited quantity of systems**, which means that only **select assets can be covered**. They are **unable to match the Russian volume** and **cannot be layered**
3. US/A&P SHORAD contributions (Stinger, Avenger, Gepard, Crotale, etc.) continue to **mitigate the expenditure of Strategic and Tactical SAMs**. However, short-range, low-altitude systems **do not have the same deterrent effect** on the threat of Russian multi-role aircraft to the FLOT and CNI.
4. **Limited or no Ukrainian Air-to-Air Defense (A2AD)**
5. **Multiple mitigating options must be simultaneously pursued** to increase decision for more sustainable solutions

Risks

1. **Increased Russian capabilities:**
   - **Air Superiority: A2AD, and Bomber freedom of aerial maneuver** (i.e. unguided munitions, etc.)
   - **Ground attack capabilities against the Ukrainian FLOT and counteroffensive** (i.e. localized air superiority, CAS, ISR, etc.)
   - **Improved accuracy, range, and survivability, of Long-range munitions** as they are no longer required to fly terrain contouring flight paths
   - **Quantity and duration of strikes, and no longer dependent on ALCMs and Shaheed UAS.**
   - **Gained ability to strike, support, and resupply via fixed and rotary wing** (i.e. Airborne Operations, Air Assault, UAS, ISR, CASEVAC, Aerial Resupply, etc.)
2. **Decreased Ukrainian capabilities:**
   - **Inability to prevent Russian air superiority**
   - **Loses the ability to strike, support, and resupply via fixed and rotary wing** (i.e. JDAM-ER, UAS, ISR, CASEVAC, Aerial Resupply, etc.)
   - **Loses the ability to mass ground forces on the FLOT and counteroffensive**
   - Ukraine will have to **choose what CNI to protect**
3. **Increased consumption rates:**
   - **SA-10 consumption rate will increase** to cover SA-11 as it goes down

Courses of Action

1. **(S//NF) Near Term (0-3 Months)**
   - **Resupply FSU SA-10 and SA-11 munitions** from allies and partners
   - **Firing Policy Change: SA-10 and SA-11 only engage TACAIR**
   - **Assist with repair of NMC FSU interceptors**
   - **(S//NF) Offensive Counter-Air (OCA)** (joint fires to include one-way attack UAS, surface fires, SOF, etc.)
   - **(S//NF) Military Deception**
   - **Firing doctrine adjustment** (weapon-to-target pairing)
2. **(S//NF) Mid Term (3-6 Months)**
   - **Solicit contributions of Western AD systems (IRIS-T, NASAMS, Patriot, I-Hawk etc.)**
   - **(S//NF) Expedite Program "FrankenSAM"**
   - Mobile Missile depots to **repair non-operational missiles**
3. **Long Term (6-9 Months)**
   - **Deliver NATO Air Defense systems at required capacity**
   - **Establish digital integration** solution for Air Defense

Notes

Threats	ADA Systems	Systems On-Hand	Systems Req.	Missiles On-Hand	Missile Exp. Rate (Monthly)	Expected Missile Exhaustion	
100K							
	Patriot	0	12*	0	TBD; Est 100		2x BTRYs for delivery in APR23 (USA & DEU); 2x Launchers Only (NLD)
	SAMP/T	0		0	TBD		1x BTRY (ITA) May 23 (Partial TBM capability)
				*EUCOM J5 Assessment			
				9x Additional Strategic SAM Batteries Required			
40K	SA-10	25	25	421	180	03 MAY 23	Primary population center and infrastructure defense
	SA-12	3	3	55	20	NOV 24	Firing rates will increase once SA-10 and SA-11 depleted
	SA-11	57	50	111	69	13 APR 23	Primary FLOT defense
	NASAMS	2	16*	105	40	MAY 23	Remaining: 6x (US); 1x (CAN); 2x (NOR)
	IRIS-T	1		10	24	MAR 23	4x Remain in Commitment (DEU)
	HAWK	0		0	TBD		Bahrain, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Turkey, UAE
	SA-8	67	67	90	20	JUNE 23	Firing rates will increase once SA-11s are depleted
	SA-5	3	3	LINK	LINK		Non-mobile, fixed sites. Legacy SAM system
	SA-3	5	2	698	33	DEC 26	Non-mobile, fixed sites. Least capable SAM system
				13x Additional Tactical SAM Batteries Required (Minimum; Goal should be ~1:1 for SA-11s)			
12K	MANPADS	N/A	2928*	192	340	MAR 23	Stinger, Igla, Strela-10
	SPADA-2000/Aspide	1	114*	11	LINK		1x Transferred (Spain); 2x Committed (Italy)
	Crotale	2		22	LINK		FRA 2x Delivered
	Avenger	0		~190	TBD; Est 25	DEC 23	12x Committed (US)
	ZSU-23	LINK		LINK Rnds	LINK		
	Gepard	20		13,800 Rnds	280	MAR 27	2x FEB; 5x APR (DEU)
				*100x Additional SHORAD Firing Units Required			

Fort Above Ground Level (Not to Scale)

Source: Wiesbaden 7.0, Annex I G3 AMD UKR Running Estimates 17FEB, Building UAF Capability 12FEB23, USAREUR-AF OPSUM 09FEB23, DSG Paper on Air Defense, Program FrankenSAM 20DEC

Consolidated UAF Air Defense

***BLUF**: Current UKR Air Defense (AD) plan balances limited resources to protect critical national infrastructure (CNI), population centers, front line of troops (FLOT), and other key assets across Ukraine. UKRs ability to provide medium range air defense to protect the FLOT will be completely reduced by MAY 23. UKR assessed to withstand 2-3 more wave strikes. As 1st Layer Defense munitions run out, 2nd and 3rd Layer expenditure rates will increase, reducing the ability to defend against Russian aerial attacks from all altitudes.*

Delivered, in country
Delivery on track
No Delivery timeline
No commitment

	Equipment	On Hand	Expend	Delivery for Commitments	Training
Medium to Long Range SAM systems (<90,000 ft)					
S300 P	Systems (UKR) Systems (POL) • SA-10 (UKR)	25x Systems 3x Systems • 421	180/month		
S300V	Systems (UKR) • SA-12 (UKR)	3x Systems • 55	20/month		
BUK	Systems (UKR) • SA-11 (UKR) • SA-11 (GBR) • AIM-7 (Big Safari)	50x Systems • 113	69/month	• 100x Potential [TBD] • 48x TBD (USN Sourcing)	
OSA	Systems (UKR) • SA-8	67x Systems • 24	20/month		
S-200	Systems (POL) • SA-5	3x Systems • Unknown	Unknown		
S-125	Systems (UKR) • SA-3	2x Systems • 698	33/month		
IRIS-T SL	Systems (UKR) • SLM System (DEU) • SLM	1x Systems • 6	24/month	5x [TBD] • 64x [TBD]	06FEB-07MAR
NASAM	System (US) • (AIM-120B) System (NOR) • AIM-120 (NOR) System (CAN) • AIM-120 (DEN)	2x Systems • 107	40/month	6x TBD (USAI) • 118x (Korea), 267x TBD 2x [TBD] • 50x [TBD] 1x [TBD] • 12x (US), 72x [TBD]	
PATRIOT	Systems (US) • GEM-T (US) • PAC-3 (US) Systems (NLD) Systems (DEU) • PAC-3 (DEU)	0x Systems	Unknown Est ~100/mo	6 Launchers x 14MAR to UKR • 16x 25 FEB (Sealift) • 73x 25 FEB (Sealift) 2 Launchers x [TBD] 4 Launchers x [TBD] • 100x [TBD]	16JAN-27MAR FEB - APR 31JAN - APR
I-HAWK	Systems (US) • Missiles Systems (ESP) • Missiles	1x Systems	N/A	USAI to purchase ESP systems • 260x [TBD inspections] 5x [1x FEB, 3x MAR, 1x APR]	16 - 29 JAN
SAMP/T	Systems (ITA)	0x Systems	Unknown	1x MAY	
SHORAD	AN/TWQ1 Avenger • Stinger SPADA-2000(ESP) SPADA-2000(ITA) • ASPIDE Missiles • ASPIDE Missiles Crotale (FRA) • Missiles GROM (POL) STARStreak (GBR) GEPARD (DEU) • 35mm	0x Systems 1x System 2x Systems • 27 0x Systems 85x Systems 20x Systems • 13800	N/A N/A N/A Unknown Unknown Unknown 280/month	6x 6 MAR (ARC Indep), 2x TBD (APS-2), 4x TBD (GTA) 2x [TBD] • 97x [TBD] 235x [TBD] 20x On Hand, 2x FEB, 5x APR	13 - 26 FEB 16 - 23 JAN
MANPAD	Various • Stinger	• 188	25/month		



Equipment/ Trans Window | Operational Window | Non-Operational Window | Air Defense Training | Expected Munition Depletion | At Risk | Strike Wave

Source: Wiesbaden 7.0, Annex J G3 AMD UKR Running Estimates 01FEB, Bu[illegible] Capability 26FEB23, USAREUR-AF OPSUM 09FEB23, OSG Paper on Air Defense, Project FrankenSAM 2DEC, Daily Reference Card Statements



This image is part of the leaked classified material that was circulated in a Discord chatroom and obtained by The Washington Post. The Post informed the Pentagon that this imagery would be published with this story. The document shows satellite images of the 22nd Separate Spetsnaz Brigade's motor pool in southwestern Russia. The images were captured, from left to right, in November 2021 and November 2022, showing a depleted force following its return from Ukraine last summer. (Obtained by The Washington Post)

Russia | Refining IO Capabilities Via Social Media Manipulation Tool (TS//SI//NF/FISA)

In late 2022, Russia's Main Scientific Research Computing Center (GlavNIVTs) planned to improve Fabrika—a network of hundreds of thousands of social media bots emulating users to evade detection and manipulate the information environment. The efforts likely will enhance Moscow's ability to control its domestic information environment and promote pro-Russia narratives abroad. (TS//SI//NF/FISA)

PROCESS FOR USING FABRIKA'S NETWORK TO CONDUCT IO (TS//SI//NF/FISA)

Graphic: (TS//SI//NF/FISA)

*The **Russian Presidential Administration** or another GlavNIVTs client within Russia's government identifies online content or audience for manipulation*

- GlavNIVTs and clients determine a platform, likely prioritizing Telegram followed by Western platforms and TikTok for external audiences
- Content aligns with strategic priorities, including building domestic support and suppressing dissent, demoralizing Ukraine, and exploiting divisions in the West

GlavNIVTs

PASSIVE MANIPULATION OF ENVIRONMENT

GlavNIVTs uses Fabrika's array of bot accounts to promote or demote content on specified platforms and search engines, including US-PER Twitter, US-PER YouTube, and TikTok

- Bots view, "like," subscribe, and repost content and manipulate view counts to move content up in search results and recommendation lists
- GlavNIVTs reports that bots on most platforms are detected less than 1% of the time

NEWS FEED / SEARCH RESULTS

1. Fabrika-promoted content
2. Genuine content
3. Genuine content

Audience sees promoted content on search engines or social media without knowing bots have manipulated algorithms into altering results

Audience is directly exposed to Russian messaging on phones and receives messages and links to content on social media from GlavNIVTs mobile infrastructure and bot accounts

GlavNIVTs sends pro-Russia messaging directly to target audiences' email or social media accounts, possibly using Fabrika-associated infrastructure

- GlavNIVTs draws user contact information from large databases it has compiled from the open and dark webs

ACTIVE MANIPULATION OF USERS

Graphic: (TS//SI//NF/FISA)